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It’s really interesting when you go to local policing teams and you 
say, do you remember so and so, you know, burglar extraordinaire 
from five years ago?  Bloody hell, yeah, I do, what happened to him?  
And you’re thinking, yeah, if you’re good at what you do, I think you 
quietly go about your business and you start to pick these individuals 
off, and they stop appearing on briefings, they stop appearing in 
custody .  And I think quietly going about your business should be the 
way that it happens (Police) .
Introduction
In November 2013, following extensive discussions between Keele University and a multi-
agency group representing Staffordshire IOM, a 12 month evaluation of the Staffordshire 
North IOM based at Longton was commissioned on the basis of a research proposal 
submitted by Professor Anne Worrall and Dr Mary Corcoran . We have produced three 
progress reports and a formal Interim Report . This is our formal Final Report .
We have approached the research in terms of both process and outcomes, in line with 
accepted academic understanding of realistic evaluation .  In terms of process, we 
have established the context of the IOM programme, taking account of its stated aims, 
monitoring implementation and providing on-going feedback to key stakeholders . In so 
doing, we have aimed to assist the IOM programme in an appreciative understanding 
of the conditions under which the IOM is most likely to succeed and the participants 
(both workers and offenders) are most likely to benefit .  In terms of outcomes, we have 
evaluated the extent to which the IOM programme aims, or selected aims, have been 
achieved . We have considered not just demonstrable reductions in re-offending, but 
other less tangible achievements such as employment, completion of drug treatment and 
improved personal circumstances .
The research has contextualised the work of the IOM programme in current criminal 
justice policy and practice and as an example of voluntary-public sector partnerships 
in community-based collaborative projects . A key objective has been to explore the 
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perspectives of relevant stakeholder groups regarding their confidence in the programme 
and willingness to support it . We have explored stakeholder awareness and understandings 
of the contribution of IOM to its stated outcomes, as well as examining the differing 
priorities and attitudes toward IOM by those agencies . 
We hope that the research will contribute to the future development of IOM as a route to 
desistance, increase understanding of the factors that support and motivate offenders’ 
participation, retention and reduction in re-offending, and increase understanding of multi-
agency work . We have identified areas of good practice, as well as obstacles to delivery and 
have established an evaluation framework that can be adapted and built upon for use in 
future projects . We have made recommendations about the sustainability and replicability 
of the programme . 
Just as this report was submitted, the Ministry of Justice published, on October 29 2014, the 
list of contractors who submitted successful bids to operate the Community Rehabilitation  
Companies .  In Staffordshire and the West Midlands, the CRC will be operated by the 
Reducing Reoffending Partnership, a consortium comprising Ingeus UK, a private  company; 
the St Giles Trust, a charity; and Crime Reduction Initiatives (CRI), also a charity .  These will 
act as lead providers, contracting work to secondary and third tier delivery organisations .   
Undoubtedly, it will be some relief to the agencies and workers in IOM and resettlement 
work more generally that they now know which lead providers they will be dealing 
with .   However, the forthcoming months and years are likely to see considerable work in 
addressing crucial questions about funding, roles, responsibilities and partnership . 
We are grateful to everyone who has made this research possible, especially those who 
have allowed themselves to be interviewed or have facilitated access to offenders for 
interview purposes .  We would like to thank those staff who have assisted us with statistical 
data . In addition to the police and probation services, we acknowledge the assistance of a 
range of stakeholders1, including: BAC O’Connor, CAB, CRI,  North Staffordshire Combined 
Healthcare/Criminal Justice Mental Health Team,  Restart, Saltbox, Stoke on Trent Housing 
Solutions, Safer City Partnership, Stoke on Trent College, Stafford and Dovegate Prisons, 
YSS Mentoring, Inspire . Finally, we have been grateful for the support of the IOM Steering 
Group and its willingness to engage in detailed reflective discussion about the progress of 
the research . 
1  In policy terms a ‘stakeholder’ refers to any  constituency, including service users, who  have an interest 
in the operation or outcome of a service . For the purposes of this evaluation, ‘stakeholders’ refers to those 
agencies which contribute to the integrated offender management process by providing services which 
support offenders .  These service areas are in  line with the pathways for reducing reoffending (housing; 
education, training and employment; health; drugs and alcohol; finance management; families; attitudes 
and behaviour; sex exploitation and violence prevention) .  Providers may be statutory (such as the NHS) 
commercial or voluntary sector, but are distinct from the police, prison and probation services in that their 
remit and obligations are not concerned with criminal justice disposals .
Executive Summary 
Background
For more than a decade, the government in England and Wales has insisted that a 
very small proportion of offenders (around 10 per cent) are committing a very large 
proportion of crime (around 50 per cent) at any point in time . Although this received 
wisdom has been challenged, it is in this context that we focus on intensive supervision 
projects for persistent and prolific offenders .  The underlying principle of such projects 
is that a combination of greater control and monitoring, together with help and 
treatment, offers the best opportunity to reduce the risk of re-offending of this group of 
predominantly young, male, non-violent offenders . The main criticisms of the projects 
are that they are resource-intensive, expensive and unproven . Evaluations, though 
increasing in number, are based on small samples and are inconclusive in their results . At 
the same time these projects represent an imaginative and alternative opportunity for 
the effective management of this specific group of offenders, whom agencies commonly 
have difficulties in engaging .
Methodology
We have drawn heavily on the realist evaluation framework, advocated by Pawson and 
Tilley . This approach has resulted in the combination of both quantitative and qualitative 
methods of data collection and analysis and also the distinction between process 
and outcome evaluation .  The former focuses on the way in which new provision is 
implemented while the latter is concerned with more traditional ‘findings’ or ‘results’ . 
Realist evaluation emphasises the complexity of interventions in the social world and 
takes account of the full range of factors that are likely to influence the success or failure 
of a programme .
We have undertaken more than 50 semi-structured interviews with programme staff, 
partners and offenders .  We have conducted two focus groups . We have carried out 
informal discussions and observations of IOM work as well as analysing selective 
statistics and reviewing relevant academic literature and policy documents .
The Staffordshire North IOM programme
The Staffordshire North IOM programme has been based at the renovated Longton 
Police Station since 2011 . Offenders are referred to the programme from a variety of 
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sources including police intelligence, probation and other partner agencies .  Their 
suitability for the programme is assessed using a scoring schema for Serious Acquisitive 
Crime (SAC) . Once accepted on the programme, the offender’s details are entered into 
ECINS computer software where a profile and running record is created .  A wide range 
of authorised personnel can then enter activities, events and reports into this record, 
providing a very detailed record of dealings with individual offenders . The supervision 
regime for offenders on the programme consists of five broad categories of activities: 
individual office appointments; programmes; purposeful leisure activities; appointments 
with partner and community agencies and home visits .  The underpinning philosophy 
is that re-offending can be reduced by support and attention to offenders’ needs 
for: housing; education, training and employment; health; drugs and alcohol; finance 
management; families; attitudes and behaviour; sex exploitation and violence prevention 
(the ‘pathways’ to desistance) . Alongside this support, however, are elements of control 
which strengthen incentives to comply with the programme .  Failure to comply results 
in breach proceedings or re-arrest, both of which are implemented more speedily than 
might be the case for offenders not subject to IOM .
Key themes from the qualitative (interview) data 
1. What makes the IOM partnership work?
A notable feature of the IOM programme is the number and diversity of 
organisations involved to different degrees in the partnership . Staff working 
in stakeholder organisations agreed that each agency must have a clear sense 
of its own mission and what it contributes to the partnership and offender 
management process .
2. Who are the IOM workers? What experience(s), qualities and training do they 
have/ need?
Some of our interviewees have had experience of working with earlier PPO 
projects, while others are new to IOM . For some, it has been a sharp learning 
curve . Within the police, there is a tension between the belief that the police 
officer can turn their hand to any required task, and a recognition that IOM 
work requires a certain ‘disposition’ . The tension is less acute in probation and 
partner agencies where the tradition and culture of the work is focussed on 
working in depth with individuals and there is a greater willingness to take on 
‘unpromising’ cases .
3. How is the IOM structured and organised?
i) The physical environment and daily routines
Despite some staff concerns about the suitability of Longton police station, 
we did not find any hostility among offenders to this environment, nor 
its geographical location .  Nevertheless, we think there are still issues 
to be discussed about a) the overcrowding of co-located staff, b) the 
management of a reception area shared by IOM attenders and the general 
public and c) the use of old-fashioned police cells and waiting area for 
interviewing offenders .
ii) Benefits of co-location for facilitating information exchange
Co-location fosters opportunities for the informal exchange of information 
that underpins a co-ordinated approach to offenders .  Staff from different 
agencies who otherwise would not have had opportunities to exchange 
routine information are able to gain insights into offenders’ progress on a 
day-to-day basis . 
iii) The challenges of the governance of IOM
There is a need for clarity around the internal categories of offenders that 
might come under the IOM umbrella e .g . statutory and non-statutory, youth 
and adult, DRR and IOM .  There is also a concern among both staff and 
offenders that, once labelled an IOM offender, it is unclear how, if ever, that 
label will be removed, especially for non-statutory offenders . Aside from the 
consequences of this for individuals, there is also no systematic creation of 
capacity within the IOM, highlighting the need for clearer progress and de-
selection procedures . Another key challenge of the governance of IOM work 
is striking a balance between participating agencies, with their distinctive 
legal powers, their criminal justice or ‘social’ responsibilities, different 
operational methods and approaches towards clients .  The need for regular 
communication through partnership meetings was highlighted .
4. How are the different roles and cultures within IOM identified and managed?
i) Relationships within the police
Attitudes towards IOM within the police vary considerably and there are 
interesting views about how far the IOM approach can be imported into 
‘mainstream’ policing and how, if at all, neighbourhood policing benefits from 
the existence of IOM . The role of ‘field officer’ is crucial in this . 
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ii) Relationships between police and probation
The key to the success of IOM is the police/probation relationship . Our 
evidence suggests that at ground level on a daily basis the police/probation 
relationship works well but there are still underlying tensions which may 
be creative and healthy or, alternatively, stressful and counter-productive . 
The momentous changes in probation work that have taken place this 
year are  already impacting on this relationship because of the uncertainty 
surrounding its future .
iii) Relationships within the wider partnership
Co-operation between statutory and non-statutory agencies is critical 
to establishing efficient working practices which allow workers from 
different agencies to discharge their roles within their respective remits . All 
participants observed that it was critical to retain a clear sight as to the core 
values and objectives of each participating agency . 
iv) Relationships with prisons
From the prison perspective, IOM offenders, like other cohorts, are one 
element in the development of sustained ‘through the gate’ services to 
provide continuity in support .  This involves forging contacts with community 
agencies, working with prisoners’ families, and facilitating accommodation 
and education, training and employment (ETE) . Prisons are important 
hubs in the IOM strategic partnership, and considerable work has gone into 
integrating personnel from statutory services and other providers into the 
offender management framework in the custody estate .
v) Housing as the pivot of IOM work
It is widely acknowledged that placing offenders in safe and reliable 
accommodation is an essential precondition to increasing the chances that 
work with offenders will have a constructive impact . Without this base, 
offenders are more likely to return to chaotic and law-breaking lifestyles 
and less likely to move on to the next phases of resettlement by securing 
treatment, education, training or life skills, for example .   There are practical 
economic consequences for prioritising their housing needs, insofar as 
the police know where they can access and monitor IOM offenders, and 
providers can target their services to clients, thereby making the most of 
their resources . 
vi) Education, training and employment for offenders
Although education, training and employment (ETE) support is flagged as 
a pathway to reducing re-offending, some central and local government 
policy decisions have had unforeseen, adverse effects on this sector .  As a 
consequence, provision has fragmented and opportunities lost to support 
prisoners to continue using the vocational skills or training they received 
in prison in employment after release . There is a need to adopt a realistic 
approach to what can be achieved with this cohort . High levels of illiteracy, 
poor socialisation and the premature termination of education among 
offenders means that expectations should be proportionate .
5. What is the impact of IOM on offenders?
i) In terms of process
The range of IOM provision available was acknowledged by offenders and 
the experience of the programme and its staff was generally very positive . 
Most offenders appreciated both their crisis contact with IOM and the 
ongoing support provided by all partners . They were not under any illusions 
about the ‘carrot and stick’ nature of IOM and knew that staff would act to 
‘control’ them if they were not willing to ‘change’ .  One practice of note is the 
frequency with which IOM staff collect offenders on release from prison and 
guide them through their first day at liberty .  This was seen as a crucial step 
to avoiding re-offending .
ii) In terms of outcomes
The most straightforward indicator of success for IOM is de-selection after 
a period of monitoring that shows a consistently low level of risk of re-
offending .  Disappointingly, there is no simple database that collects data 
on de-selections and this is a missed opportunity to showcase the work of 
IOM . In fairness, however, the picture is usually more complex than this with 
offenders reducing, rather than ceasing, their re-offending and/or reducing 
the seriousness of their offences . To complicate the picture further, IOM is not 
just about ‘change’ but also about ‘control’ and an offender may be recalled 
to prison for non-compliance, even if they have not actually re-offended, in 
order to prevent re-offending . Approximately a third of the IOM offenders at 
Longton are in prison at any one time and it is a matter for debate whether, 
and to what extent, this should be regarded as success or failure for IOM .
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III) Recognising individual outcomes
Given the limitations of capturing outcomes statistically, those with 
professional experience of working with offenders also adopt a threshold 
of ‘success’ which attributes tangible and subtler changes to offenders as 
a result of their engagement . Participation in IOM may not necessarily take 
individuals immediately or entirely away from a life of crime .  However, it has 
an observed impact on slowing down the rate at which individuals proceed 
through the revolving door between prison, community and back again .  One 
pointer of success is that the engagement with IOM offenders with their 
services is far higher than for other cohorts of offenders .  Whilst apparently 
counter-intuitive, the logic is that getting offenders to engage with IOM is 
the first step of a longer process of tackling the underlying, complex causes 
of crime .  In the long run, this generates added value in that the IOM process 
becomes greater than the sum of its constituent parts, thereby adding to 
cost efficiency .
6. What is the future for IOM?
I) Types of offenders and approaches
There has been much discussion about the wisdom of expanding the IOM 
approach to include other types of offenders, especially violence, including 
domestic violence, sex offenders and, more recently, gangs . While some felt 
this would be wholly inappropriate, most considered that the principles of 
IOM could be applied to a wide range of offenders, possibly all .  But it was 
recognised that the specific interventions needed would differ and would 
require careful planning and development . We are suggesting a different 
approach to identifying those offenders most likely to benefit from IOM 
and this involves placing less focus on the nature of an offender’s offences 
and more on their ‘readiness to benefit’ in terms of personal characteristics, 
circumstances and stage in their criminal career . 
II) Relationships with ‘mainstream’ policing
A constant theme throughout our research has been the extent to which IOM 
can act as a model for policing more generally .  While some still consider 
IOM to be a specialism that requires different qualities and skills from other 
forms of policing, others consider it to be very close to good neighbourhood 
policing .  From management and political perspectives, one of the ways in 
which the resources allocated to IOM can be justified is for the principles 
of the work to be widely disseminated within the police service and to be 
integrated into other areas of work . But IOM is not the only form of multi-
agency work and there is a danger that expectations of IOM will outstrip its 
specific model so that it will be stretched to such an extent that it becomes 
compromised and ineffective .
III) Future of probation under Transforming Rehabilitation
The Probation Service nationally has been split into two organisations – 
NPS and 21 CRCs – with the latter being prepared to be sold off to the 
voluntary and private sectors during the research period . Probation workers 
have an uncertain future in the IOM, which has been designated as CRC 
work . All agencies were preparing for the contingencies presented by 
the new landscape for service providers . These issues reach well beyond 
the remit of our research but we find it difficult to see a future for IOM 
without highlighting the extreme turbulence that probation workers are 
currently experiencing .
Performance data and other statistics
 It is proving very difficult for IOM programmes nationally to demonstrate their 
effectiveness in terms of providing hard statistical evidence of reduced re-offending .  In 
this section we report on the ways in which the IOM in North Staffordshire is attempting 
to address this .  Given the unclear national picture, we believe that these efforts are 
commendable and, more importantly, there is active discussion at every level about how 
the data can be improved .
On a smaller local scale, we have been monitoring the risk assessment progress over 6 
months of a randomly generated sample of 30 IOM offenders (roughly 10% of all IOM 
offenders and 1 in 7 of those not in prison) .  With a number of significant caveats, it 
appears to us that approximately half of our sample has succeeded in lowering their 
risk assessment score over the 6 month monitoring period and half has a raised score .  
Additional pre- and post-IOM arrest data broadly support this conclusion . 
Case studies 
Throughout the research we have been conscious of a need to identify those offenders 
who benefit most from IOM and to offer some suggestions about why that might be so . 
We identify four categories of offenders for whom IOM has impacted, in different ways 
and for different reasons:  
Category 1:  Last chance before custody – predominantly young adult offenders who 
have not yet experienced custody but are heading in that direction .
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Category 2: Prison regulars finally ready to change – predominantly older offenders who 
have spent many years in prison but have ‘had enough’ .
Category 3: Vulnerable non-copers – offenders whose complex needs mean that they 
simply could not survive in the community without the support that IOM offers .
Category 4: Not yet ready to change – offenders who may or may not co-operate 
superficially but who are not yet able to make significant changes to their lives and 
continue to re-offend when they feel under pressure .
Cost Analysis
We have provided a simple ‘cost analysis’ based on an economic evaluation that deals 
only with the costs of interventions .  We have made use of two case studies to set out 
the basic costs and potential areas of saving which may be associated with interventions 
under the IOM programme . By using case studies, we can set out more detail about the 
interventions that offenders receive and also give information about possible outcomes . 
Estimations are based on ‘the public sector cost of crime’, that is, the costs to the 
taxpayer of responding to, investigating, processing and punishing crimes and breaches .  
Costs of interventions are set against costs to the police, courts, probation services and 
the Safer City partnership . This is then compared with a ‘value for money’ calculation 
(Matrix Knowledge Group, 2007) .  The ‘value for money’ formula describes the net 
saving that can accrue per offender on the programme when compared with the costs 
of sending them to prison . We have estimated that Case Study A accrued a saving of 
approximately £37,500 and Case Study B accrued a saving of approximately £14,515 .
Conclusions and recommendations
We have ample evidence of the process of IOM:  inputs (staff, physical environment, 
financial and technological resources, information exchange); activities (programmes, 
appointments, support, surveillance, purposeful leisure activities, skills training); 
and outputs (intelligence, partnership development, individual offender profiles, risk 
assessment and social progress) . This evidence has been overwhelmingly positive .  We 
have met enthusiastic, committed workers from all involved agencies, who believe 
passionately in IOM and can present compelling rationales for, and descriptions of, their 
work . Among a range of commendable work, we identify a number of specific areas of 
good practice .
In terms of outcomes and impacts, the evidence presented in this report indicates 
that where the IOM works, it works very well, both in improving the lives of persistent 
acquisitive criminals and in reducing their levels of re-offending .  More systematic 
collection of de-selection data would demonstrate this more convincingly .  But it 
does not work for everyone on the programme .  It is clear that many offenders are 
not ready for ‘change’ .  At present, this does not mean that they are programme 
‘failures’ because they can still be successfully ‘controlled’ .  However, this contradictory 
definition of programme success makes it all but impossible to produce the clear 
performance indicators that commissioners – and the general public – require . This is 
particularly pertinent at a time when the Police and Crime Commissioner is taking more 
responsibility for the structure and nature of multi-agency partnerships . Consequently, 
there is a need to review the aims and objectives of IOM to take account of this 
complexity .  We suggest this discussion may result in a choice between two new future 
directions for IOM .
Direction 1:  IOM as ‘acute medicine’
•	 IOM is regarded as akin to acute medicine – a specific model of multi-agency 
work to which those with the most complex needs are assigned for a finite 
period of time before being moved to lower levels of support and/or control .
•	 Within this model, participants may be selected, in addition to their needs, not so 
much according to the nature of their offences but according to their ‘readiness 
to benefit’ from the programme . 
•	 We have suggested three different categories of offender who might be ready to 
benefit: those who are at risk of a first custodial sentence; those who are ‘burned 
out’ by years of prison sentences; and, the vulnerable non-copers who cannot 
avoid prison without support .
•	 We have suggested that a fourth category of those not ready to change should 
either not be selected for IOM or should be de-selected rapidly if they fail to 
engage with it at a minimum required level .
•	 If a concept of ‘readiness to benefit’ were incorporated into the selection process, 
this would have implications for offenders’ progress through the programme and 
their de-selection from it .
Direction 2: IOM as a broad set of principles
•	 IOM is not the only model of multi-agency work and is not necessarily the best 
model for all cohorts of offenders .
•	 Nevertheless, the present model is underpinned by a set of key principles which 
could form the basis for the development of other models .
•	 There are also examples of good practice that could be rolled out for use in other 
partnership arrangements .
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•	 However, moving in this direction, it would not be appropriate to simply apply 
the existing IOM model to a range of other situations .  Each new situation would 
require the fresh application of IOM principles and the development of tailored 
and apposite multi-agency interventions . 
Whichever direction IOM takes, there are a number of shorter-term recommendations 
that we would make on the basis of our findings which will enhance the programme’s 
ability to produce evidence of its success for internal and external audiences:
•	 The re-introduction of a series of formal periodic reviews involving partnership 
representation for all participants with a clear pathway to de-selection for both 
statutory and non-statutory participants .  De-selection to be a performance 
indicator of success .
•	 The collection of simple statistics on the recruitment, progress and de-selection 
of participants and production of regular accessible reports on this data 
(recognising that speedy re-arrest and re-conviction may also be an indicator 
of success) .
•	 The production of regular trend reports from ECINS data e .g . in respect of 
risk assessment .
•	 A series of IOM staff meetings to support and monitor the impact of the changes 
resulting from Transforming Rehabilitation .
•	 The instigation of regular middle management partnership meetings to deal with 
programme development at the operational level between strategy and day-to-
day work .
•	 The development of an internal communications strategy to enable all partners 
to feel fully involved in programme developments .
•	 The development of an external communications strategy to ensure the 
dissemination of good practice and good news to external audiences .
•	 Drawing up an Action Plan that will identify tasks, responsibilities and timescales 
across the partnership for addressing this report and its recommendations .
Chapter 1   
Background and policy review 
A fully referenced version of the history of intensive offender 
supervision appears in Appendix 2 .
For more than a decade, the government in England and Wales has insisted that a 
very small proportion of offenders (around 10 per cent) are committing a very large 
proportion of crime (around 50 per cent) at any point in time . Although this received 
wisdom has been challenged, it is in this context that we focus on intensive supervision 
projects for persistent and prolific offenders .  The underlying principle of such projects 
is that a combination of greater control and monitoring, together with help and 
treatment, offers the best opportunity to reduce the risk of re-offending of this group of 
predominantly young, male, non-violent offenders . The main criticisms of the projects 
are that they are resource-intensive, expensive and unproven . Evaluations, though 
increasing in number, are based on small samples and are inconclusive in their results . At 
the same time these projects represent an imaginative and alternative opportunity for 
the effective management of this specific group of offenders, whom agencies commonly 
have difficulties in engaging .
Intensive projects for prolific and persistent offenders in England and Wales can be 
viewed as both a recent innovation - emerging from the convergence of intelligence-led 
policing and evidence-based probation, modelled on a European initiative and given 
impetus by the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act – and as the latest incarnation of a much 
older penal pre-occupation with persistent offending and intensive supervision . In order 
to understand the challenges and benefits of the projects, it is necessary to locate them 
within both short and longer term historical perspectives . 
The latest incarnation includes, but extends beyond, existing Prolific and other Priority 
Offender (PPO) projects . Integrated Offender Management has been an attempt by 
the Ministry of Justice to provide a ‘strategic umbrella’ to co-ordinate all multi-agency 
approaches to intensive supervision .  It has been an attempt to operationalise the 
concept of ‘end-to-end offender management’ introduced by the Carter Report (2003) 
with a key aim of ‘disrupting’ an offender’s criminal activity and thus reducing the risk 
of re-offending . Six pioneer sites were funded by the government in 2008/2009 and 
have been subject to evaluation . Integrated Offender Management is now the nationally 
recognised framework for local multi-agency collaboration in working with offenders .  
18 19
Integrated Offender Management Research Project - Final Report, October 2014 Integrated Offender Management Research Project - Final Report, October 2014
A joint Home Office and Ministry of Justice document (2010) identified the five key 
principles of IOM as being:
•	 All partners tackling offenders together
•	 Delivering a local response to local problems
•	 Offenders facing their responsibility or facing the consequences
•	 Making better use of existing programmes and governance
•	 All offenders at high risk of causing serious harm and/or re-offending are 
‘in scope’ .
Prolific offender projects for adult offenders were originally concerned with the 
reduction of volume property crime, predominantly theft and burglary, although more 
recent projects now accept offenders with some form of current or past violence in their 
records .  The central feature of such projects has been the combination of intensive 
attention from both the police and probation services, with ready access to provision by 
other partner agencies . 
The other characteristics of the projects derive from this central feature:  
•	  The project is staffed by designated police and probation personnel, and located 
on either police or probation premises (the significance of different locations 
being under-evaluated) .
•	 Participants in the project are required to meet local criteria that categorise them 
as ‘prolific’ - that is, among the most persistent offenders in the locality – and 
allocate a risk assessment score to them .
•	 Participants were historically subject to formal court orders of supervision or 
post-custodial licence but, importantly, IOM programmes now include substantial 
numbers of non-statutory offenders who are not subject to current court orders . 
•	 Participants are subject to high levels of police monitoring and intensive 
probation supervision which seek to address their offending behaviour and also 
to assist with other offending-related needs such as housing, substance misuse, 
leisure, education and employment . 
•	 In order to achieve this, there has to be an agreed mechanism of information 
exchange between participating agencies (not just police and probation) . 
•	 Finally, there is an agreed procedure for swift enforcement in the event of non-
compliance or further offending (which requires the co-operation of courts) .
The body of evaluation research on projects for PPOs is neither large nor conclusive . 
However, the number of studies is increasing, comprising a mixture of independent 
evaluations by academics, often on a limited budget and larger scale national or 
multi-site evaluations undertaken by Home Office and Ministry of Justice researchers . 
Evaluators have typically had to work with small sample sizes and, in some cases, 
without a matched comparison group . The resulting reports and their conclusions 
tend to be highly qualified in relation to reduced offending and cost effectiveness . 
Nevertheless, many of the evaluations emerging in the UK have provided optimism that 
PPO projects can be effective in reducing the offending of the participant group . This 
message, however tentatively expressed, has been politically expedient for governments . 
In 2009, the Ministry of Justice declared that projects could result in a ‘62% reduction in 
recorded convictions over 17 months’ (2009:6) .  This is by far the most optimistic finding 
of any project, though the overall direction of findings has been consistent over more 
than a decade . 
Two recent documents provide a national picture of IOM . The College of Policing’s (2013) 
‘Stocktake’ report covers, at a national level, many of the issues we have identified 
at a local level in our research, in relation to both examples of good practice and the 
under-development of performance management .  The Home Office’s (2014) findings 
from the 2013 survey of Community Safety Partnerships highlighted the variation in 
provision across the country and the future impact on IOM provision of the Transforming 
Rehabilitation  agenda .
The role of Police and Crime Commissioners has also had a widespread impact on the 
development of IOM, requiring such programmes to be both more visibly accountable 
and more openly competitive for resources .  Locally, the Staffordshire PCC has indicated 
his broad support for IOM stating that ‘Managing Offenders’ is one of his four key 
priorities for Safer, Fairer, United Communities (PCC website) .  
It is widely acknowledged that PPO and IOM projects are complex in terms of their 
multi-agency nature and the needs of their clientèle . Their value should be judged 
beyond crime rates and cost effectiveness, though these are of course important . Other 
criteria which should be taken into account include, on the one hand, health, educational 
and social benefits for participants and, on the other hand, improved multi-agency 
working and information exchange between project partners, and improved intelligence 
on prolific offenders .  Participants have identified the following benefits:
•	 stopped or reduced their offending whilst they were on the project;
•	 kept them occupied;
•	 provided them with a sense of purpose;
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•	 helped with their drugs problems;
•	 built their confidence in doing everyday things, e .g ., finding accommodation, 
dealing with the utility companies, social interaction; and 
•	 helped the rebuilding of relationships with families (partners, children 
and parents) .
All evaluations identify lessons or issues which might be summarised as:
•	 Embedding the project and establishing its credibility, securing long-
term funding;
•	 Having clear mechanisms for recruitment, selection and de-selection 
of participants;
•	 Demonstrating effective multi-agency practices, while recognising the distinctive 
contributions of each agency and resisting the blurring of agency boundaries;
•	 Planning for team development and for human resource contingencies, so 
that the levels of stress experienced by staff involved in such intensive work 
are minimised;
•	 Developing a challenging but supportive supervision regime with linked exit 
strategies, so that participants are not ‘set up to fail’ by the imposition of 
unrealistic multiple demands;
•	 Identifying and addressing the communications needs specific to the project, 
so that the aims and objectives of the project are widely understood among 
partner agencies;
•	 Evidencing impact in the funded period .
We conclude this section with a quotation from the recent joint inspection of IOM by HM 
Inspectorate of Probation and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary .  Despite its length, we 
think that this succinctly summarises both the value and the challenges of IOM work:
Overall, our findings about the outcomes of the Integrated Offender 
Management approach give rise to cautious optimism . It was 
clear to us that the right offenders were targeted; there were 
some indications that offenders’ lives had improved because their 
problems, such as substance misuse, had been addressed . Although 
re-offending rates could be regarded as disappointing, we saw this 
as symptomatic of the entrenched pattern of offending among the 
Integrated Offender Management cohort, rather than as a failure of 
the approach itself . 
Critically, we found that the absence of a structured and systematic 
approach to evaluation is undermining efforts to assess and report 
on the effectiveness of Integrated Offender Management . It is 
a commonsense approach that intuitively feels right . However, 
the absence of clear evidence of effectiveness in terms of both 
crime reduction and reducing re-offending inhibits understanding 
of its impact and value . If the evidence showed that Integrated 
Offender Management was successful in reducing crime and re-
offending, there would be a strong case for further investment . 
If not, a rethink would be needed . We think that the Integrated 
Offender Management approach has real potential; however, in the 
absence of robust evidence to support this, we cannot make a firm 
recommendation either way (2014:4)
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Chapter 2   
Methodology 
Theoretical framework
We have drawn heavily on the realist evaluation framework, advocated by Pawson and 
Tilley, because our experience over the past decade has indicated that this is the most 
appropriate methodological approach for evaluating complex social and public policy 
provision such as the IOM programme . This approach has resulted in the combination of 
both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis and also the 
distinction between process and outcome evaluation .  The former focuses on the way in 
which new provision is implemented while the latter is concerned with more traditional 
‘findings’ or ‘results’ . Realist evaluation emphasises the complexity of interventions in the 
social world and demands that evaluations take account of the full range of factors that 
are likely to influence the success or failure of a programme . Pawson (2013) provides 
an extremely helpful ‘complexity checklist’ that covers inter alia the choices, pathways, 
contexts, time-scales, contestations and unintended consequences that should form part 
of any attempt to evaluate a programme (see Appendix 1) . This approach has proved 
popular with both evaluators and those responsible for programmes, but has been less 
popular with governments that desire quick and clear findings to inform their short-term 
funding decisions .
Practicalities
With the team working approximately the equivalent of one day per week for a year we 
have undertaken the following work in accordance with our contract:
•	 a review of relevant academic and policy literature 
•	 communicated across the partnership through a briefing meeting and 
two newsletters 
•	 undertaken over 50 semi-structured interviews of IOM staff – police (19), 
probation and prisons (10) and stakeholders (12)  – and offenders (10)
•	 conducted two focus groups with a total of 12 members from different 
partner organisations
•	 undertaken numerous informal discussions with staff, stakeholders and 
offenders, including accompanying field officers on home visits and attending a 
computer class at a local library
•	 randomly selected a sample of IOM offenders on ECINS and monitored their 
progress in consultation with relevant IOM staff
•	 selected case studies for more detailed examination and cost analysis
•	 attended two management meetings about the internal collection of 
statistical data
•	 produced three progress reports  and an interim report
•	 attended steering group meetings
Limitations to methodology and lessons learnt
While we have fulfilled (and in some ways exceeded) the terms of our contract , there 
have been a number of limitations to the research which might be described as ‘lessons 
learnt’ for future evaluation research:
•	 We have been conscious that the scope of our research has been limited by time 
and resources .  There is more that we would like to have done to gain a fuller 
picture of the IOM across Staffordshire but that has not been possible in the time 
available and the resources allocated .  
•	 The dramatic changes to the national penal landscape over the past year, 
together with local changes to personnel and priorities in both the police and 
probation, have meant that we have often felt that we are ‘running to catch up’ 
with the impact of these changes on the programme and on our evaluation of it . 
We discuss examples of this later in the report .
•	 During the research, the problems associated with the collection of statistical 
data (by no means unique to this programme) became increasingly apparent and 
our quantitative data analysis, including cost analysis, has had to adjust to this .
•	 We have conducted a rudimentary cost analysis of interventions  for illustrative 
purposes only .  This is not a substitute for  more sophisticated economic 
modelling of impact, outputs, costs and savings which can be provided by 
actuarial experts .  ‘Cost benefit analysis’ relies on actuarial and econometric 
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projections to determine whether investment in a given service produces 
worthwhile outputs or even savings .  
•	 More fundamentally, however, the research has been limited by the difficulty in 
what has been described as ‘assessing additionality’ (Wong 2013) .  While we 
are confident that we have been able to capture the complexity of IOM in this 
report and to provide a narrative that demonstrates its impact, we have been no 
more successful than any other researchers in this specific field in providing a 
compelling statistical argument that demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt that 
IOM reduces re-offending .  
Reference:
Wong, K . (2013) ‘Integrated Offender Management: Assessing the Impact and Benefits – 
holy grail or fool’s errand?’ British Journal of Community Justice, 11,2/3, 59-81
Chapter 3   
A brief description of the IOM unit 
at Longton 
The Staffordshire North IOM programme has been based at the renovated Longton 
Police Station since 2011 .  Police and Probation staff who formerly worked on PPO and 
DRR (Drug Rehabilitation Referral) projects in other parts of Stoke-on-Trent moved 
to Longton along with staff from relevant healthcare, housing and voluntary sector 
agencies . The IOM occupies the ground floor of the building .
Accommodation for offenders consists of access through the public reception area to a 
corridor, leading to the old police station premises, which have been converted to make 
a waiting room and a number of interview rooms (formerly cells) .  Staff accommodation 
consists of two moderately sized, but very crowded, offices, housing 20-30 police, 
civilian, probation, health and admin staff . Senior staff have single or shared offices 
in the old station area .  There is also a group programme room, a healthcare room, a 
teleconference room and a staff kitchen .  In addition to the IOM programme, staff also 
work with DRR offenders from this building . Away from the police station, teams of 
field officers are seconded to the IOM from Local Policing Teams .  This is a unique local 
feature of the Staffordshire IOM units .
Offenders are referred to the programme from a variety of sources including police 
intelligence, probation and other partner agencies .  Their suitability for the programme 
is assessed using a scoring schema for Serious Acquisitive Crime (SAC) .  Acceptance on 
the programme in Staffordshire requires an initial PPO score of at least 70, while Stoke-
on-Trent based offenders require a score of 90 .  The discrepancy is historical in origin 
but is in line with government policy that the term ‘prolific’ should be locally defined . 
Those with a score of 40-69 (50-89 in Stoke) become IOM Targets; those scoring less 
than 40 (50 in Stoke) are either rejected or placed in the ‘Monitor’ cohort . Offenders will 
be re-referred if their circumstances change .
The Staffordshire North IOM programme currently consists of around 360 offenders, 
about a third of whom are in prison at any one time .  The remainder are classified as 
Prolific/ Priority Offenders (PPOs), PPO Targets, Custody Diversion (CuD), CuD Targets, 
Deter Young Offenders (DYOs), DYO Targets, Targets and Monitors .  The various classes 
of ‘Targets’ are mostly non-statutory offenders who are not on current court orders, 
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while the remainder are statutory .  ‘Monitors’ are those who appear to be no longer 
offending and are awaiting de-selection .  
Once accepted on the programme, the offender’s details are entered into ECINS 
computer software where a profile and running record is created .  A wide range of 
authorised personnel can then enter activities, events and reports into this record, 
providing a very detailed record of dealings with individual offenders . Although 
authorised to do so, however, probation staff do not contribute to this record .  They 
are required to use Probation Service records and, consequently, contributing to ECINS 
would duplicate their work .
The supervision regime for offenders on the programme consists of five broad 
categories of activities: individual office appointments (which might be daily at times 
of crisis); programmes (e .g . Building Skills for Recovery, Information Technology, work 
skills, victim empathy); purposeful leisure activities (eg . football, boxing); appointments 
with partner and community agencies (e .g . housing, employment, drugs testing and 
treatment, debt, healthcare) and home visits (from police and probation) .  Additionally, 
offenders are supported through court appearances and release from prison (including 
visits while in prison) . The underpinning philosophy is that re-offending can be reduced 
by support and attention to offenders’ needs for: accommodation, education, training, 
employment, physical and mental health, drugs and alcohol treatment, finances, family 
relationships, attitudes, thinking and behaviour (the ‘pathways’ to desistance) . 
Alongside this support, however, are elements of control which strengthen incentives 
to comply with the programme .  Failure to comply results in breach proceedings or 
re-arrest, both of which are implemented more speedily than might be the case for 
offenders not subject to IOM . All offenders have their risk levels reassessed whenever 
necessary – often on a daily basis – using a scoring matrix that covers recent offending 
history, risk of harm, relevant intelligence/ arrests, linked crime series and a re-offending 
multiplier .  This produces scores of 0 to 64 .  Those scoring 39-64 are classified as High/
Red (and may be marked as Wanted if there are outstanding matters); those scored 
at 20-38 are classified as Medium/Amber; those scored at 0-19 are classified as Low/ 
Green (though a score of 0 may indicate that the offender is in prison) . It should be 
noted that changes in scores are only a guide and do not necessarily imply changes in 
re-offending; they could equally indicate changes in circumstances (e .g . housing, drugs) 
or compliance .
Chapter 4   
Interview data: Key themes 
We have undertaken over 50 interviews, as contracted, most of which have been 
recorded and transcribed . Interviews have been with IOM staff, mostly based at Longton, 
and have consisted of a mix of police, probation and partnership staff, as well as 
offenders and other stakeholders based elsewhere . Interviews have lasted between 10 
and 75 minutes, the majority lasting between 40 and 60 minutes and each transcription 
runs to about 20 pages .  Although the interviews followed a broad schedule of topics, 
our approach has been conversational and we have consequently obtained rich 
narratives of how staff, partners and offenders view the IOM, their roles and relationships 
within it and its future . We have identified a number of key themes, which we discuss 
briefly below, based on six key questions . To preserve the anonymity of participants, we 
have simply identified them as ‘police’, ‘probation’, ‘prison’, ‘stakeholder’ or ‘offender’ 
without identifying them any further for the purposes of this report . In the sections 
below, the themes are framed by core and supplementary questions and/or our 
observations, followed by selected quotations from the interviews .
1. What makes the IOM partnership work?
Corcoran and Fox (2013) found that the robustness of local partnerships focusing on 
offenders with complex needs benefits where operational staff are given scope to 
develop collaborative networks; where their work complements that of their partners; 
where there is equality and ‘respect’ among the different agencies; and where there 
is a clear division of responsibilities .  Past research has found certain conditions to be 
more amenable than others for bringing practitioners from several occupational sectors 
and cultures together . In their analysis of joint working among police, probation and 
prison services, Mawby and colleagues  (2007) noted the importance of obtaining a 
‘conducive framework’ for facilitating co-operation across several agencies . The addition 
of voluntary sector and statutory health, housing and educational providers brings 
another element of complexity to the provider ‘mix’ .  Sustainable partnerships rely on a 
number of conditions for reconciling different organisational objectives within a multi-
agency project .  These include; (a) establishing clearly defined and agreed objectives; 
(b) all stakeholders contributing personnel and resources proportionate to their roles 
and responsibilities in the partnership; and (c) a clear delineation of operational territory 
and respect for jurisdictional boundaries among agencies .   
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A notable feature of the IOM programme is the number and diversity of organisations 
involved to different degrees in the partnership .  This opened up questions about the 
work involved in forming and sustaining partnership in the complex circumstances of 
multi-agency mixes, as well as the challenges involved in co-ordinating interactions 
across several sectors and agencies .  Staff working in stakeholder organisations agreed 
that each agency must have a clear sense of its own mission and what it contributes to 
the partnership and offender management process .
Research also suggests that the disposition of the ‘core’ (statutory criminal justice) 
partners is a determining factor in forging ‘reluctant’ or ‘committed’ partnerships .   
The former arises when a ‘minimalist and grudging approach’ towards partnership 
is adopted . By contrast, ‘committed partnerships’ occur where: (a) partners are able 
to adapt policy ‘from above’ to local conditions; (b) participants are constructively 
disposed towards the idea of partnership; (c) clear and mutually agreed definitions 
of roles and responsibilities are in place; (d) joint projects are underwritten by the 
commitment of financial or staff resources by all parties, and; (e) the voluntary sector is 
not marginalised . 
So this was about – the clue’s in the title – Integrated Offender 
Management .  It was designed to try and come up with a common 
programme that everyone could play a part in actually meeting the 
needs of those offenders (Stakeholder) .
Coming into it with a relatively fresh pair of eyes,  I think there’s 
some very, very good aspects to the IOM set-up in Staffordshire…
around the partnership . And the organisations and pathways that 
are being delivered through IOM is a real strong point (Probation) .
One of the things that’s been significantly different in Staffordshire 
compared to a lot of other areas has been the strategic planning 
and design around a lot of the systems…Unless you’ve got senior 
buy-in, any sort of partnership model isn’t going to work… When 
it comes to things like shared service, joint commissioning, long 
term commissioning, then you’re never going to achieve that unless 
you’ve got senior stakeholder buy-in around a way of working with 
a particular cohort of people that we know are high intense users of 
services (Stakeholder) .
The partnership world can be very superficial…this is much more 
that the right people are actually doing the right things… it is about 
relationships…so and so who happens to work for probation and so 
and so who happens to work for health (Police) .  
I invited magistrates to come…and when they left, they said ‘we 
can’t tell who’s who – who’s the nurse, who’s the doctor, who’s the 
probation officer, who’s the police officer’ and that’s exactly what I 
wanted to achieve… We’ve all got distinct roles but it’s one unit that 
works together on that one person (Probation) .
We’re all in the same building but we’re perhaps not co-working 
together (Police) .
2. Who are IOM workers? What experience(s), qualities and attitudes do they have?
Some of our interviewees have had experience of working with earlier PPO projects, 
while others are new to IOM .  Those who are new did not receive any formal additional 
training and have had to learn on the job .  For some, it has been a sharp learning curve:
I’ve never worked in partnership before .  I’ve never worked 
in anything like this .  So it’s extremely challenging but very 
enjoyable (Police) .
Within the police, there is a tension between the belief that the police officer can 
turn their hand to any required task, and a recognition that IOM work requires a 
certain ‘disposition’:
Can we be omnicompetent from being a public order officer one 
minute to being a family liaison officer in the other, that within 
us we have that omniability to be very confrontational and very 
physical, through to being very reflective, very empathetic, very 
emotionally intelligent .  And my view is, while we would love that 
wide range of omnicompetence, I don’t think it exists, not at the 
mastering level (Police) .
Perhaps some of the most proactive…police officers who would be 
held up as excellent police officers, perhaps weren’t the best field 
officers (Police) .
Not a big thief taker, but a problem solver (Police)
X [police] has almost become an adopted probation 
officer (Probation) .
You definitely need people that are interested in this area of work…
if they don’t have the fire in their belly, carry on doing frontline 
policing or be a detective (Police) .
30 31
Integrated Offender Management Research Project - Final Report, October 2014 Integrated Offender Management Research Project - Final Report, October 2014
The tension is less acute in probation and partner agencies where the tradition and 
culture of the work is focussed on working in depth with individuals . Although by 
no means always clear cut, there are undoubtedly some basic differences in working 
practices among the public, private and voluntary sectors . In very broad terms, the 
public sector model of service delivery is based on principles of universalism, whereby 
all clients are entitled to a minimum (and are sometimes restricted to a maximum) level 
of service, which should apply regardless of geography or individual circumstance .  The 
voluntary sector tends to individualise its services to a much greater degree, based 
on upon perceptions of need, clients’ wishes, client-worker relationships, volunteer 
availability .  Private sector providers tend to be driven by rational calculations about 
the most cost-effective way of producing specified results . The result is that it is often 
difficult to describe a ‘standard’ way of working within a single IOM partnership .   What 
we noted was the creativity, enthusiasm and positive approach taken by staff from 
different agencies to establish clear and common goals and co-operative working 
practices which would allow partnership to develop organically from the bottom-up .  
The following discussion offers examples of good practice underpinning resilience and 
common purpose on the part of staff .
A notable feature of IOM is that all stakeholders are committed to the common objective 
of taking on the most unpromising cases – typically persistent and prolific offenders 
with long records of recidivism who have major social and personal problems . One 
of the issues that has caused considerable debate with the advent of competitive 
commissioning is that, in order to meet re-offending reductions, contractors may 
become ‘risk averse’ by investing little time and resources in the most ‘unpromising’ 
cases (‘parking’) and will focus instead on those they judge to need relatively little input 
to significantly increase their chances of avoiding criminal behaviour (‘cream-skimming’) . 
IOM partners have undertaken a calculated ‘risk’ in taking the shared view that they 
should concentrate mainly on working with the most difficult and complex offenders, 
recognising that this can be highly resource-intensive and will often produce mixed 
or even negative results in the short term .  Staff from several agencies spoke from the 
conviction of experience that persistence can ultimately lead to transformations in the 
lives of some individuals . It can be argued that to ‘turn round’ the life of one individual 
of this kind has a higher cost-benefit ratio over the long term than to prevent several 
‘occasional’ offenders from re-offending in the short term .
 And we’ve got one guy at the minute … he’s worked with us from 
the very beginning, so about six or seven years . Still drinking, got an 
alcohol problem, but that hasn’t led into offending behaviour .  And 
even though he’s not on the police’s books for offending, we’ve still 
carried on working with him, to try and get him to that fulfilled life 
where he doesn’t have to resort back to it . He’s come an amazingly 
long way …and we’re still not there (Stakeholder) .   
Indeed, there is some evidence that, even when they know that their ‘performance 
figures’ may initially suffer as a result, agencies in IOM will continue to work intensively 
with those most complex cases .
I think there’s quite a number of successes .  They might not sound 
very successful but even people who can go six months without 
committing an offence is amazing for somebody who’s burgled 14 
houses a day or something . I’ve got people that I’ve worked with 
that have gone two or three years without offending (Stakeholder) .  
Unsurprisingly, stakeholders working in the areas of drugs and alcohol addiction or 
mental health diagnosed offending as a consequence of underlying trauma .  They 
envisaged IOM as an opportunity to make deep interventions to address the personal 
causes of chaotic, troubled or violent behaviour which was intrinsically related 
to offending:
But I guess that underlying mental health need was never treated or 
diagnosed they’ve perhaps gone on to use substances or alcohol to 
manage that as a coping mechanism (Stakeholder) .
It isn’t just about giving them a script and saying, ‘let’s have this 
methadone’ .  Because actually the reality of it is it’s not dealing 
with the problem, it’s just giving them something to stop them from 
offending, really . (Stakeholder) .  
3. How is IOM routinely structured and organised?
i) The physical environment and daily routines
At the interim stage, we questioned the suitability of Longton Police Station as 
an IOM environment:
Sometimes it feels like you’re contradicting your work ethic…
because you’re inviting people into a police station (Probation) .
Just even by the nature of how you open the door, the 
fact the door’s so heavy on a cell…it’s all reminders of bad 
experiences (Probation) .
They’re thinking ‘actually I’m in a police cell here’ . And it can’t 
be the best environment for them really (Police) .
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When we first moved, it (caseload) did dip a bit, but I think that 
was more the fact that we were in a working police station .  
But now they know that they’re not going to get jumped on 
every time they walk through the door, they are here, they do 
recognise that the help is there if they want it (Stakeholder) .
Despite these concerns, we did not find any hostility among offenders to this 
environment, nor its geographical location .  Nevertheless, we think there are 
still issues to be discussed about a) the overcrowding of co-located staff, 
b) the management of a reception area shared by IOM attenders and the 
general public and c) the use of old-fashioned police cells and waiting area for 
interviewing offenders .
We have a lot of data about daily routines and how things fit together . For the 
police, the early morning briefing meeting sets the day’s schedule but there are 
also routine appointments with probation and other agencies that need to be 
co-ordinated as well as weekly programmes to be delivered, home visits, court 
reports, drug testing and treatment, prison visits and a variety of other multi-
agency activities .  There are inevitable points of tension but, by and large, daily 
co-operation in the programme’s routines appears impressive:
So it can feel quite chaotic at times, but it’s a fairly organised 
chaos (Probation) .
ii) Benefits of co-location for facilitating information exchange
An advantage of co-location is that it fosters opportunities for the informal 
exchange of information that underpins a co-ordinated approach to offenders .  
Staff from different agencies who otherwise would not have had opportunities 
to exchange routine information are able to gain insights into offenders’ 
progress on a day-to-day basis .  Several noted that pooling information in this 
way helped to  update their knowledge about the circumstances of offenders . 
Additionally, informal exchanges helped with integrating staff from agencies 
into what they initially perceived to be a police-probation conversation . Routine 
communication also provides a very important ‘early warning system’ for alerting 
service providers to potential problems, or for adding additional contextual 
information to the needs which clients presented .  For other stakeholders, 
informal discussions about clients helped to identify additional needs .  This helps 
to intercept offenders whose problems may not have been previously diagnosed 
and were therefore in danger of ‘slipping through the net’:
If you want the information, you can get it…and I know it sounds 
daft, we’re in the same building but we’re two flights up the 
stairs, and it makes a difference (Stakeholder) .
There’s even a difference between the big room and the smaller 
room where the probation officers are .  Because even the police 
don’t communicate with probation very well, and yet they’re 
sitting in the same room .  But I think it’s a lot more joined 
up from an outside agency point of view than it used to be 
(Stakeholder) .  
We’re building up relationships, we’re getting to know systems, 
procedures, protocols .  We’re building up relationships with 
the IOM staff . I suppose it’s just more information enhances our 
knowledge and enhances our role (Stakeholder) .  
We’re available for probation officers to come and talk to us or 
the police officers to come and talk to us about any concerns 
that they’ve got .  That can be from a personal point of view 
about, “I’ve got this chap on my beat who’s bloody difficult to 
work with, I think he’s Aspergic, how would you suggest that 
we work with him?”, all the way through to, “I’ve got this chap 
on my caseload, he was doing absolutely fine and something’s 
gone on”, and looking at how to work with more direct cases 
(Stakeholder) .  
It’s just making sure that nobody’s missed, really (Stakeholder) .
Nevertheless, this informal exchange was not viewed as sufficiently systematic, 
with several stakeholders noting that the complex composition of agencies in 
IOM meant that it was extremely difficult to convene formal, periodic, inter-
agency case reviews . All non-statutory stakeholders noted that some formalised 
exchange of information and flexible system of case review was desirable: 
Perhaps something to think about for the future is maybe 
go to one of their team meetings for half an hour and have a 
chat, because it’s like anything, you can never get all the team 
together in one place at the same time, they’re never always 
there .  So maybe that could be an option (Stakeholder) .
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iii)   Challenges of the governance of IOM .
At the interim stage, we identified a need for clarity around the internal 
categories of offenders that might come under the IOM umbrella e .g . statutory 
and non-statutory, youth and adult, DRR and IOM .  We also identified a 
concern among both staff and offenders that, once labelled an IOM offender, 
it was unclear how, if ever, that label would be removed, especially for non-
statutory offenders:
The law’s completely different about how you deal with a young 
person to an adult .  The police officers have had to learn quick 
around what we can and can’t do (Police) .
People will say DRRs are all under the same umbrella .  They’re 
not because they don’t have field officers and they’re not IOMs, 
so they’re treated very differently (Probation) .
IOM would say they [non-statutories] have no choice…they are 
going to be an IOM offender because they’ve gone through 
the scoring matrix…[but] when you’re selling something 
like that, there’s not that many people that will completely 
disengage (Police) .
Since then, even more significant issues have arisen about a) IOM cohorts and b) 
IOM progression from selection to de-selection .  The two issues came together 
over a specific request to the programme to create additional capacity for a 
cohort of gang-related offenders .  This is discussed further later in the report but 
the resulting discussion about programme capacity raised some important issues 
about the nature of the programme .  One police officer used a medical analogy 
to liken IOM to acute medicine or intensive care .  The implication of this is that 
offenders spend a finite amount of time on IOM and are routinely gradually 
moved on to lower levels of support – to the ordinary wards – thus creating more 
capacity at the intensive end . A secondary implication is that an offender does 
not come out of ‘intensive care’ cured:
When you’ve got people in very intensive care…then it’s highly 
unlikely that those people are quickly going to come out of that 
intensive care and support and be cured .  Rather than if we 
were in a small fractures clinic [where] they’re easily fixed and 
outcomes are easy to measure (Police) .
If IOM is seen as a very intensive approach which is designed 
to get people to a position where they’re able to continue 
[with]…an approach that is less intensive, then I think you’re 
able to actually achieve more of a beginning, a middle and an 
end (Probation) .
Another key challenge of the governance of IOM work is striking a balance 
between participating agencies, with their distinctive legal powers, their criminal 
justice or ‘social’ responsibilities, different operational methods and approaches 
towards clients . One wider debate has focused on the anticipated reluctance 
of non-statutory agencies outside criminal justice to report offenders for 
potentially breachable activities lest it compromise their relationship with them .   
On the whole, this was resolved by acknowledging the ‘need to know’ basis of 
exchanging such information:
I think we can make joint decisions with the other agencies in 
the areas that affect us .  Not all the areas affect us, like…their 
offending background, it doesn’t affect us .  It’s nice to know 
what they’ve done in the past and perhaps to look at why 
they’ve done it, but I couldn’t send a report to court if they’ve 
committed a further offence, suggesting to the judge what they 
should get (Stakeholder) . 
All participants however, drew a clear distinction between retaining trust and 
confidentiality and disclosure on clear safeguarding grounds:
We do have to make clear to people that if they were to 
divulge in interview offending behaviour, we would have to 
take that forward .  And that sometimes can jeopardise our 
relationship a little bit with people .  We have a confidentiality 
form that we ask people to sign, so that we are allowed to share 
information (Stakeholder) .
Non-statutory partners sometimes found that they were at a disadvantage 
because they were not informed about outcomes nor given access to 
feedback on their activities which they felt would improve their contribution to 
the partnership:
I suppose it’s getting the feedback from the probation officers 
and evaluating that; is it working, isn’t it working, what could we 
do?  (Stakeholder) .
Sometimes if somebody’s been arrested or if they have 
committed another offence, they’re wanted even, sometimes 
we’re not privy to that information (Stakeholder) .
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The success of IOM in terms of its expansion has contributed to the unforeseen 
consequence that systematic inter-agency communication has diminished .  
The increasing caseload has contributed to the loss of a regular, scheduled 
forum for case management and review involving all the agencies .  Staff 
from almost all agencies regretted the lack of opportunities to hold regular 
case reviews .  Some noted that this had been an indispensible element of the 
previous PPO programme, and argued that the practice had added significantly 
to the efficiency and effectiveness of their responses to offenders . Several 
acknowledged that convening all agencies on a weekly basis was impractical, 
and it was sometimes inappropriate for staff from certain agencies to sit in on 
such reviews routinely .  However, as the case load grows, reliance on informal, 
less systematic opportunities to share information from different agencies 
will come under strain, and possibly contribute to lapses in the exchange and 
interception of critical knowledge and information . 
I think it’s a good programme and it really works .  They just 
need to sort out the communication issues (Stakeholder) .
 The fact [is] that the team’s become so big that it’s lost 
that communication .  Certainly, as a partner agency, the 
communication thing’s gone .  Unless I ring up and say what’s 
happened with this particular person, I don’t know anything 
about them .  They do have briefings and they say, ‘a Wednesday 
morning is supposed to be when the agencies have their 
meetings’, but you’ll turn up and it’s cancelled – ‘Oh, we’re 
having it tomorrow’ .  But when you’re busy, you can’t…It’s got 
to stay at that time every week, so that people know it’s in the 
diary and they can attend (Stakeholder) . 
There used to be tasking meetings where we used to talk about 
every offender and all the agencies used to input about them, 
and they used to have MAPPA meetings as well, where we used 
to meet one to one .  And I understand the team’s got so big that 
that might not be possible but I think it’s lost that element of 
communication (Stakeholder) .  
4. How are the different roles and cultures within IOM identified and managed?
i) Relationships within police
Attitudes towards IOM within the police vary considerably and there are 
interesting views about how far the IOM approach can be imported into 
‘mainstream’ policing and how, if at all, neighbourhood policing benefits from 
the existence of IOM . Presentations have been made to all LPTs in the hope of 
changing some remaining negative attitudes towards IOM .
Police officers with a lot of service have come down to the unit 
and you can tell they don’t want to be here – this is the cuddly 
IOM unit .  No it’s not, it’s not about that at all… I think that 
image is changing (Police) .
The role of ‘field officer’ is crucial in this .  Seconded from LPTs to the IOM for 
what was originally intended to be a fixed period, field officers remain based 
in LPTs and act as a bridge between IOM and other police teams .  They act as 
the eyes and ears of IOM, visiting offenders at home on a regular basis, offering 
support but also feeding back intelligence to colleagues both at IOM and the 
LPT .  Our observations suggest that field officers develop a strong rapport with 
many offenders and a level of trust that would normally be unexpected between 
police and offenders .
One original aim of the field officer was to disseminate the principles of IOM 
to local police and to encourage a wider adoption of IOM skills among their 
colleagues, thus enhancing the skill sets of neighbourhood police officers .  
Whether or not this has happened is a matter of debate .  Indeed, the following 
exchange between two field officers summarises the debate about the 
appropriateness of this work for the police:
FO1: Whether the police are the right people really to be doing 
it, I don’t know, because we are all about enforcement and that 
really, but somebody should definitely be doing it .  Or maybe it 
should be us, maybe…
FO2: You see, I disagree, I think it should be us because… I think 
that we are viewed differently when we turn up on somebody’s 
door - I think that does have an impact .  And even though when 
we have formed that relationship, they do, kind of, like, forget 
who you are .  When there’s something going on that they 
shouldn’t be doing, they remember who we are, more or less . 
One stakeholder, however, suggested that the ‘change’ aspect of the field 
officer’s role would be better carried out by a peer mentor:
So if you’re wanting long term outcomes, you’re not going to 
get it by cops in jeans and t-shirts going on knocking on doors… 
So ex-offenders trained up to do peer support to go and engage 
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with people in prison, meet them when they come out and 
then get them engaged in activity and a support mechanism…
that is sustainable and everybody gets a dividend from 
it (Stakeholder) .
ii) Relationships between police and probation 
The key to the success of IOM is the police/ probation relationship .  Mawby 
and Worrall (2013) have argued that this relationship has been one of mutual 
suspicion historically but that this has improved dramatically over the past 
couple of decades, largely due to increased multi-agency working and a 
willingness on both sides to change cultures and attitudes .  This suspicion is still 
identifiable but we did not find it widespread:
Very suspicious of the police .  I guess everybody knows that 
the reason they want to be involved with probation and the 
statutory offenders is so that they can arrest them…I made a 
decision a long time ago that if any of mine turn up here and 
they are wanted and they’re going to be arrested, I have nothing 
to do with that .  I stay firmly at my desk (Probation) .
The police version of this was rather different:
It just drives you to the point of distraction .  Where we are 
meant to be integrated, we are meant to be working towards 
the same thing but the probation staff don’t tell you when their 
offenders are in and you have to rush around and see if they’ve 
come in .  We have people come in who are wanted and have 
walked out and we didn’t even know… we will get absolutely 
hammered (Police) .
Despite a general view that probation is responsible for the ‘change’ aspect of 
IOM and the police for the ‘control’ aspect, we found the reality to be very much 
less clear-cut, especially in relation to non-statutory offenders .  Field officers, in 
particular, are very committed to a rehabilitative approach to offenders .  Some 
believed that probation had relinquished this aspect of the work:
If we say to a probation officer, we’ve been two or three times 
last week [on a home visit], do you know this, that and the 
other about him, and they go ‘no’ .  Because they only see what 
that person wants them to see…I don’t think they have a lot of 
time to get out of the office .  I think they’ve got appointments, 
people coming in…work programmes and things like that…
(Police) .
On the other hand, the police’s enthusiasm for ‘change’ and rehabilitation was 
viewed with scepticism by some:
I always think police can add value to the rehabilitation side 
[but] they have what they call these pathways .  Which for 
me, it’s like somebody doing a Powerpoint presentation – 
they’ve read a paragraph about desistance theory .  I find 
it a bit disingenuous…because it doesn’t seem there’s an 
understanding of what it means – it’s just a word (Probation) .
Unlike some IOM programmes in other areas, there is a sense that this IOM 
programme is police-led .  This is particularly evident in the referral and 
selection process . While probation can make referrals to IOM, offenders are only 
selected if they meet the scoring criteria .  The criteria were originally agreed 
between partners but this is not always understood and leads to a view that the 
programme is run  by the police ‘very much on their terms’ (Probation) .
Our evidence suggests that at ground level on a daily basis the police/probation 
relationship works well but there are still underlying tensions which may be 
creative and healthy or, alternatively, stressful and counter-productive:
I would suggest the police were under more pressure to ‘give’ to 
make it work than the probation service were (Police) .
It doesn’t have to be harmonious… it’s the pull and tug that 
makes it so successful (Probation) .
But I do think because people are quite clear in what their roles 
and boundaries are, we don’t have maybe some of the clashes 
that people may have thought we’d actually have because of 
history and culture (Probation) .
The momentous changes in probation work that have taken place this year are 
discussed more fully later but are already impacting on this relationship because 
of the uncertainty surrounding its future .  More immediately, issues around 
information exchange between the NPS and the CRC have consequences for 
routine information exchange between probation and police about, for example, 
plans to visit offenders at home (e .g . for safeguarding purposes) and even 
consultation about whether offenders should be a) de-selected or b) breached 
for non-compliance .
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iii) Relationships with the wider partnership
Co-operation between statutory and non-statutory agencies is critical to 
establishing efficient working practices which allow workers from different 
agencies to discharge their roles within their respective remits . One voluntary 
sector stakeholder noted: 
We will look at the needs of the actual person .  And we will 
take into account what the [police and probation] officers [are] 
saying, but it’s about the individual and about what they think 
their offending is, and how they got there .  But they [police and 
probation] manage the risk for us, they manage the boundaries 
of what we can do and where we can go, dependent on that .  
And then we do the work out in the community (Stakeholder) .
It’s important to view the person as a whole really, the whole 
holistic approach .  And sometimes it can be hard to see past the 
offending (Stakeholder) .
All participants observed that it was critical to retain a clear sight as to the core 
values and objectives of each participating agency . Agencies are not expected 
to  undertake functions or responsibilities that are beyond their remit, or which 
might be likely to undermine their distinctive approach towards clients . The clear 
division of roles and functions underlines clarity and trust between agencies with 
different service ethos and operational cultures and obligations:
Probation trust us to just get on with what we need to do and 
let them know what’s happening .  We’ve never had any issue 
where they’ve stopped us from doing something .  They trust us 
to know what we’re doing and know that, that’s what helps that 
person to move forward (Stakeholder) .  
This stakeholder went on to say that this inter-agency relationship between the          
community and public sector was particularly successful in North Staffordshire 
in comparison with other IOM areas in which her agency operated .  By contrast, 
other stakeholders commented on the process of adjusting to working not only 
within criminal justice, but with agencies such as the police and probation which 
had different styles and approaches:
Probation are just very focused on what they work for and 
what they want to achieve, and they perhaps don’t take into 
account the requirements of other agencies .  It’s been a bit 
different really with the police .  We didn’t know what to expect 
when we first came, but I can honestly say, I do believe we’ve 
got a really good working relationship with the police .  They 
share information with us, we share information with them .  
If there’s anything we’re not sure of, we talk to them about 
it (Stakeholder) .
The statutory-community sector relationship is underpinned by the expectation 
that the voluntary sector provides specialist or ‘niche’ services which enhance, 
rather than take over, the role of existing statutory services .  One volunteer 
organisation which provides peer mentoring support for IOM offenders observed 
that their service, although apparently at a soft ‘marginal’ aspect, was in fact a 
critical ‘glue’ or ‘cement’ to the work being undertaken at the statutory level:
I think it’s crucial really in some senses .  And I think if you speak 
to police officers, they’ll say the same .  Because even though 
maybe the expectation is the field officers are about dealing 
with some of these problems in the community, they haven’t 
got time, they’ve got 600-odd offenders that they’re keeping an 
eye on .  One of the things they’ve said to me is they haven’t got 
the quality time that we’ve got to be able to sit with someone 
and work through that (Stakeholder) .  
The importance of partnership was the added value which it brought to 
individual services, making the whole more effective: 
I think they need the whole package . You’ve got probation, 
which are working with them to address their offending, 
to look at keeping appointments, to look at keeping court 
appointments . You’ve got the police who are aware of who’s 
on what order, making sure that they’re available if the client 
wants to phone up and talk to them, if there’s anything they’re 
not sure about .  You’ve got housing agencies that come into the 
IOM … [and] benefits and drugs treatment .   So you’re looking at 
the whole approach really (Stakeholder) .
We complement each other in terms of our assessment skills, 
because we bring two different approaches  … And hopefully, 
that …leads to a good assessment and a good knowledge of 
services and support needed (Stakeholder) .
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iv)  Relationships  with prisons 
The Staffordshire IOM programme has coincided with the broader policy shift  
towards establishing a ‘whole prison’ approach, in which prisons are tasked 
with supporting resettlement as one of their primary functions .  Under the 
most recent round of re-rolling (August 2014), six prisons in the region were 
redesignated as resettlement prisons: Birmingham, Brinsford YOI, Dovegate, 
Drake Hall (Female), Foston Hall (Female) and Oakwood . One particular 
achievement has been the relocation of most IOM offenders to prisons in 
the Staffordshire and West Midlands areas, forming the basis for making 
resettlement a more coordinated transitional process for all concerned:
My big drive and passion at the moment is working far closer 
with our region’s prisons…We’ve now got over 80% of our 
offenders in Staffordshire prisons (Police) .
From the prison perspective, IOM offenders, like other cohorts, are one element 
in the development of sustained ‘through the gate’ services to provide continuity 
in support .  This involves forging contacts with community agencies, working 
with prisoners’ families, and facilitating accommodation and education, training 
and employment (ETE):
You know, it’s not that whether they’re an IOM offender or not, 
priority isn’t given just because they’re IOM .  Priority is given to 
every single offender that we identify on reception into prison 
that have got each of those issues, that we’ve already got a 
resettlement team in place that try to help them and sort out 
the benefits straightaway …  Those services are already available 
within the prison to fundamentally try to arrange and sort 
out before even IOM gets to that point of having to intervene .  
So it’s not like we don’t already run with a resettlement 
approach (Prison) .
Prisons are important hubs in the IOM strategic partnership, and considerable 
work has gone into integrating personnel from statutory services and other 
providers into the offender management framework in the custody estate .  In 
practical terms, this has been facilitated by seconding personnel to ‘external 
work’ .  Examples include police field officers visiting IOM offenders in custody 
to maintain continuity in the relationship and to contribute to planning the 
transition to release . In turn, prison officers are based at Longton for part of 
the week,  enabling them to access to E-CINS,  to ‘work closely with other 
statutory agencies’ and to support pre-release work involving ‘all the community 
partners’ (Prison):
Those that are due for release the following month, … they 
will get seen by the field officer .  They would come in, the 
police officer would come in, [the] offender manager if 
they’re involved and supervise the substance misuse, anybody 
from resettlement, so that a comprehensive recovery plan 
and resettlement plan is produced for the prisoner, so that 
accommodation,  everything is addressed and in place ready for 
the prisoner to be released (Prison) .
One of my workers in substance misuse, work[s] alongside 
one of the field officers in the IOM .  So it was a joint [initiative 
to]  do outreach and, where possible, to motivate and engage 
offenders post release to work with services (Prison) .  
Engagement in IOM has delivered several strategic and practical advantages 
for the prison service . The prison estate did not initially have a mandate as a 
responsible partner with respect to managing prolific offenders beyond the gate, 
and  prison managers spoke highly of the ‘outstanding’  efforts of the police and 
probation services to create a bridge for them into the strategic IOM partnership .  
From the vantage point of the prisons, the development of IOM work also 
supports the broader mission of breaking down barriers between prisons and 
communities . Involvement has also facilitated strategic and operational co-
ordination between the prisons and the ‘more traditional partners’ such as the 
youth justice, police and probation services (Prison) .  Prison staff described the 
constructive, long term benefits of partnership in terms of a continual learning 
curve informing the work being done in prison establishments, thereby further 
contributing to the wider goals of IOM:
[It is about] trying to find the strengths of the custodial estate… 
Can we bring this into the prisons, and then take our own 
intensive work back into the community so as not to waste that 
work? (Prisons) .
Importantly, staff interviewed from the prison sector are confident that the IOM 
model has had a positive influence in curbing persistent re-offending . Staff from 
two prisons perceived that they were seeing fewer of the same faces among the 
IOM cohort returning to their establishments .  Whilst capturing this in statistical 
terms is complex, there are some tentative suggestions from the indicative 
data which one establishment collated of the ‘statistically significant reductions’ 
in re-offending in which identified the ‘IOM hub work was the distinguishing 
factor’ (Prison) .  The other prison attributed the work of IOM police officers 
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to supporting a more constructive attitude among offenders to engaging in 
the programme:
I’ve seen IOM work, it is tangible .  There are practical solutions 
available to work with complicated clienteles (Prison) .
Certainly with the reputation of the police, it’s reduced a lot 
of barriers, certainly with offenders … we’ve collated feedback 
forms and we’ve had some really good feedback from the 
prolific offenders that, in the past, have never engaged but 
they’ve seen and experienced positive outcomes (Prison) .  
Despite the energy of staff and the observed benefits of joint working in 
supporting offenders, gaps remain in the chain of supports available to people 
exiting custody .  This undermines the objective of creating ‘seamless’, ‘end 
to end supports’ which are thought to contribute to stabilising offenders’ 
immediate situation as a precursor to progressing to more independent lives .  
This is not uniquely a challenge for Staffordshire IOM, as research repeatedly 
confirms the correlation between failures to address former prisoners’ most basic 
requirements (accommodation, income, treatment) and increased risks that they 
will resort to crime: 
We struggle with people coming out of prison who have not 
got an appointment for benefits, they’re waiting weeks . We’re 
getting that wrong somewhere (Police) .  
I’m not sure how strong the links are from an education, 
training and employment perspective .  I know there’s good links 
with local stakeholders such as your Saltbox, Restart, ARCH 
and your hostels .  I think from an employment, training and 
education perspective, that’s always is a difficult one .  Housing 
still remains a difficult one  … when you certainly look from a 
Staffordshire perspective, that’s just Northern, but when you 
start looking at Southern IOM, accommodation is far and fewer 
between, there are more difficulties there .  So I think area, 
location does [matter] (Prison) .
v)  Housing as the pivot for IOM work
It is widely acknowledged that placing offenders in safe and reliable 
accommodation is an essential precondition to increasing the chances that work 
with offenders will have a constructive impact .   This was recently restated in the 
Resettlement Thematic Report of the Joint Inspectorate of Prisons and Probation 
with Ofsted, which summarised the ‘Catch-22’-style conundrum in which people 
leaving custody are caught:
Having somewhere sustainable to live was an essential 
prerequisite to getting and holding down a job . Without a 
secure place to live, it was very difficult to get a job; without a 
job, it was difficult to afford a place to live’ (Joint Inspectorate 
and Ofsted: 2014: 7) .
Without this base, offenders are more likely to return to chaotic and lawbreaking 
lifestyles and less likely to move on to the next phases of resettlement by 
securing treatment, education, training or life skills, for example . There are 
practical economic consequences for prioritising their housing needs, insofar 
as the police know where they can access and monitor IOM offenders, and 
providers can target their services to clients, thereby making the most of their 
resources .  The role of the police and prisons in making initial housing needs 
assessment renders the process more efficient, ultimately saving time and money 
for housing providers . 
Generally, recently released individuals who are not returning to family will 
be placed in temporary accommodation before moving on to a longer term 
tenancy .  All too often, local authorities regard those exiting custody as having 
made themselves intentionally homeless . Ex-prisoners may have forfeited their 
tenancy if they go into custody . In Staffordshire, statutory housing providers 
seek to avoid such discrimination while working within the legislative framework .  
Police and prison staff noted how reliant they were on the voluntary sector to 
provide emergency accommodation .  However, another bottleneck arose down 
the line because of shortages of suitable housing stock for single people . Prolific 
offenders are generally stigmatised by landlords, while sympathetic landlords 
are unwilling to take on vulnerable/chaotic tenants if they have had previous 
problems with this group .  Housing providers suggest that a combination of 
IOM-style monitoring and cash ‘bonds’ or guarantees could be a practical 
response to incentivising private-sector and social landlords to take on the most 
‘difficult’ tenants:
Housing is very difficult .  It’s difficult who we’re housing people 
with .  So we might have somebody in a stable place and the 
only place that we can house them is in a vulnerable place .  And 
I don’t think that’s actively looked at . … We will mix anybody 
with anybody because we can say they’re housed (Police) .
There’s no blanket policy in terms of all ex-offenders who 
get sent to prison are going to be intentional .  We’re not 
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allowed to do that .  We have to look at each case on its 
merit (Stakeholder) .  
We spend more time with IOM guys .  Particularly, we tried 
an intensive support scheme .  That was like for the worst 
of the worst of the IOM kind of clients coming through the 
system (Stakeholder) .
The main problem is the majority of offenders that come out are 
single people who need a one bedroom flat, and the council has 
a limited amount of one bedroom accommodation . So the fact 
that they’re an offender isn’t the biggest problem sometimes 
with the council - it can be - it’s the fact we don’t have any 
accommodation for them (Stakeholder) .
That’s the only way I can see it going forward is if all the 
providers were to put up some money to say,  “this is a 
prevention pot” . Seventy quids’ worth of arrears, they won’t 
let them back in unless that’s paid off .  The police could easily 
could go,  ‘right, there’s the seventy quid, let’s get somebody 
in’  (Stakeholder) .
vi)  Education and training and employment (ETE) for offenders
Although education, training and employment (ETE) support is flagged as a 
pathway to reducing reoffending, some central and local government policy 
decisions have had unforeseen, adverse effects on this sector .  As a consequence, 
provision has fragmented and opportunities lost to support prisoners to continue 
using the vocational skills or training they received in prison in employment 
after release .
Stakeholders cited several examples where outreach or special provision for 
offenders have been fragmented or withdrawn . These included, for example, the 
cessation of specialist support from the Connexions service, which had referred 
clients with offending or at-risk attributes to educational providers . Secondly, 
the decline of provision in local colleges for offenders arose because of changes 
in the funding regime .  Consequently, longstanding relationships between 
prisons and local educational providers, who had built up knowledge of the local 
economy and employers, was discontinued . Some groups of offenders, such as 
women, are further disadvantaged because they are less likely to be in custody 
in their home region . Thirdly, some local initiatives stepped in to support ex-
prisoners’ needs in areas such as elementary preparation for independent living 
and purposeful activity, such as the Building Skills for Recovery, Information 
Technology, work skills, victim empathy, football, and boxing . Government, 
commissioners and funders would like to see a more explicit transition from the 
acquisition of ‘soft’ skills to ‘hard’ qualifications, certification and employment .  
The interviews with local educational providers, reflecting the findings of 
research, suggest that certain courses of action might facilitate this transition .   
These include adopting a realistic approach as to what can be achieved with this 
cohort . High levels of illiteracy, poor socialisation and the premature termination 
of education among offenders means that expectations should be proportionate . 
Local and national experts have stressed that it is impractical to consider ‘soft’ 
and ‘hard’ skills separately for this cohort . To quote the recent Thematic Report 
on Resettlement:
 Reliability, trustworthiness, the ability to work on their own 
initiative and good customer service are essential to an 
offender’s employment prospects, and can be developed 
or discouraged in many aspects of an offender’s experience 
– not just what happens in workshops or classrooms (Joint 
Inspectorate and Ofsted, 2014:  7) .
In Stoke, when you think of the type of area that we’re in, 
we’re in very much  … a low income, low skill area . [And] the 
additional burden of having a prison sentence  … they need to 
be able to do that little bit more than someone who’s just long 
term unemployed (Stakeholder)
The general barriers that people come across in employability 
skills is not just about qualifications, it is about attitude, it’s 
about being able to socialise or being able to react, interact 
socially with people (Stakeholder) .  
The female release is all over the place .  It could be Northwest, 
it could be Southeast, it could be wherever .  So really it’s 
much, much harder to actually provide them with a realistic 
and relevant training path because you can’t touch all those 
areas (Stakeholder) .
A further barrier to consistent support from life-skills to training to employment 
lies in the complex terrain of service commissioning and procurement .  Currently, 
education, training and employment provision (ETE) is competitively tendered 
out under the rules of the regional offenders’ learning and skills service (OLASS) . 
In practice, prison education contracts for several establishments tend to be 
awarded to large national providers .  Local providers who have lost out may be 
subcontracted to provide ‘niche’ courses, but interpretation of the current rules 
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tends to rule this option out because local competitors appear to require the 
permission of the existing contract holder to submit tenders .  One educational 
stakeholder explained why they had withdrawn from working with prolific 
prisoners in prison:
The current state of play with regards to funding in custody is 
that we can’t do that unless we get the agreement from the 
OLASS provider . Because the OLASS potholders, if you want 
to call them, hold that funding now, it does mean that we are 
slightly removed from work in custody … Colleges that have 
used their core funding, their ASP funding, outskills budget 
funding, in the past, no longer can use that unless they have 
the permission of the OLASS provider .  I suppose the basis 
there is really what the government doesn’t want to do is 
pay for OLASS, that OLASS money not being used, and then 
use other pots of money to cover some of the shortfall that’s 
happening (Stakeholder) .  
5. What is the impact of the IOM on offenders?
This is the area where we had least evidence at the interim stage .  We have now 
incorporated both qualitative data from interviews with offenders and some quantitative 
analysis from ECINS and other statistical databases .  In a later section of this report we 
show how we have developed case studies . In this section we refer to more general 
comments about the programme .  
i)  In terms of process
Most of the offenders we spoke to had become involved in crime in their early or 
mid teens:
…got involved with the wrong crowd, started smoking 
marijuana .  Then, one day, there’s a few other lads there, they 
had heroin and I started to use heroin .  And before I knew it, I 
was using every day and then I was addicted .  And since I was 
16, I’ve been in and out of jail, so it’s a revolving door since I was 
16 (Offender) .
The range of IOM provision available was acknowledged:
I’ve got that many appointments… I’ve got appointments every 
day, I have, near enough (Offender) .
The experience of the IOM and its staff was generally very positive as these 
quotations indicate:
Have I took things from [IOM]? Yes . Basically, I used to be an 
everyday heroin user . I’m no longer an everyday heroin user 
but I do occasionally use it .  So I’ve took that from it, you know 
what I mean, it’s slowed me down .  So I’d say that’s a good thing 
about it, it has actually give me better skills in life to deal with …
trigger situations (Offender) .
Yeah, there is support .  They’re good people…They put a lot of 
effort into some of the things they do .  I mean [my probation 
officer] is a brilliant bloke .  I can speak to him about anything 
and he’d be there (Offender) .
One practice of note is the frequency with which IOM staff collect offenders on 
release from prison (see comments above on relationships with prisons) and 
guide them through their first day at liberty:
 And obviously we try to settle them down, so by the end of 
the day we should know where they’re living, what their state 
of mind is, who they intend to meet up with later in the day .  
Because they do have a really good natter to you on the way 
back [from prison release](Police) .
Because the first day is the most important . Because if you get 
your head on the pillow that first night and you haven’t messed 
up, you’ve got a good chance the next day .  That’s where 
support’s needed to actually turn up at the prison gate and go 
“I’m your IOM officer…this is what we’ll do” (Offender) .
ii)  In terms of outcomes
The most straightforward indicator of success for IOM is de-selection after a 
period of monitoring that shows a consistently low level of risk of re-offending .  
Disappointingly, there is no simple database that collects data on de-selections 
and this is a missed opportunity to showcase the work of IOM .  We strongly 
recommend that this information is collected in a clear and accessible form 
because, otherwise, much good work is going unacknowledged .  A recent 
(unscientific) random sample of de-selected offenders showed a dramatic 
reduction in re-offending after de-selection .
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In fairness, however, the picture is usually more complex than this:
Somebody might be on minus ten and gets to minus three by 
the time he’s come there [IOM] . Actually, he’s still offending 
but he isn’t maybe burgling domestic dwellings, he isn’t maybe 
using as many drugs, he’s maybe changed his choice of drugs 
from heroin to cannabis . So that for me is a form of progress… 
but that doesn’t get recognised (Probation) .
To complicate the picture further, it was pointed out to us on several occasions 
that IOM is not just about ‘change’ but also about ‘control’:
And I wasn’t happy at all…you go in, they swab your hands 
for drugs, they take your footprints, they put you under the 
ultraviolet light to see if you’ve done any burglaries (Offender) .
‘They’ also check out offenders’ living conditions in similar ways and are perfectly 
prepared to recall an offender to prison for non-compliance, even if they have 
not actually re-offended, in order to prevent re-offending . Approximately a third 
of the IOM offenders at Longton are in prison at any one time and it is a matter 
for debate whether, and to what extent, this should be regarded as success or 
failure for IOM .
iii)  Recognising individual outcomes
Given the limitations of capturing  outcomes statistically, those with professional 
experience of working with offenders also adopt a threshold of ‘success’ 
which attributes tangible and subtler changes to offenders as a result of their 
engagement .  These  thresholds coincide with criminological desistance theory 
which recognises the steps towards primary desistance (the initial tentative 
changes in towards behaviour and attitude)  that form the basis of secondary 
desistance (more consistently law-abiding behaviour and thinking) .  The 
evidence may be modest by the expectations of outside observers especially as 
participation in IOM may not necessarily take individuals immediately or entirely 
away from a life of crime .  However, for staff it has an observed impact on 
slowing down the rate at which individuals proceed through the revolving door 
between prison, community and back again .  One pointer of success is that IOM 
offenders engage with statutory and voluntary sector services to a far higher  
degree than other cohorts of offenders .  Whilst apparently counter-intuitive, the 
logic is that getting offenders to engage with IOM is the first step of a longer 
process of tackling the underlying, complex causes of crime .  In the long run, this 
generates added value in that the IOM process becomes greater than the sum of 
its constituent parts, thereby adding to cost efficiency in the long run:
I think we’ve proved ourselves… our results speak for 
themselves .  When we’ve done an assessment recently, 
probation did on our reducing reoffending rate, and the 
generic probation, we reduced it by 14%; which is quite high 
really (Stakeholder) .
 We have people on court order who breached their probation 
order .  But in the IOM unit, we don’t get them very often . My 
opinion would be that the engagement rates are higher in the 
IOM unit than across general probation (Stakeholder) .
We can provide those figures but we do them every time a 
client exits, we record on their exit plan exactly how many days 
that they stayed with us . … We’re looking at not necessarily 
being the people that cure somebody and we make that 
massive change .  Did we make a difference to that person?  
And actually in terms of finances, did we make a reduction just 
on costs in general?  Because somebody staying out of prison 
for six more weeks longer, it’s six more weeks of money into a 
pot (Stakeholder) .
6.  What is the future for IOM?
i)  Types of offenders and approaches
At the interim stage, there was much discussion about the wisdom of expanding 
the IOM approach to include other types of offenders, especially violence, 
including domestic violence, and sex offenders . While some felt this would 
be wholly inappropriate, most considered that the principles of IOM could be 
applied to a wide range of offenders, possibly all .  But it was recognised that the 
specific interventions needed would differ and would require careful planning 
and development:
Domestic violence is different…it’s far more complex and you 
have to approach it in a different way (Probation) .
I think the principle of IOM can work for any type of offender 
[but] operationally, in this unit, the way it works, I’m not 
sure (Probation) .
Since then, the programme has been overtaken by a specific crisis concerning 
gang-related offending .  The IOM was asked to accommodate a large influx of 
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actual and potential gang members, many of whom were juveniles . This was 
seen to be an indicator of respect for, and confidence in, IOM and an opportunity 
to make a major contribution to local policing .  However, in order to create 
the capacity required, it was necessary to de-select a large number of low risk 
offenders, even though they did not formally meet the de-selection criteria .  
This change occurred too late in our evaluation process for us to make any 
further comment but we recommend that a)  specific interventions relevant 
to this new cohort are explicitly developed as a matter of urgency and b) the 
work is carefully monitored in order to identify ‘lessons learnt’, be they positive 
or negative .
As will be seen in a later section of this report, we are suggesting a different 
approach to identifying those offenders most likely to benefit from IOM and this 
involves placing less focus on the nature of an offender’s offences and more on 
their ‘readiness to benefit’ in terms of personal characteristics, circumstances 
and stage in their criminal career .  This is different from, though may include, an 
offender’s perceived level of ‘motivation’ .  In line with desistance theory, it also 
includes an offender’s developmental stage, life experiences, personal resources 
and sources of support (or social capital) .  Assessing ‘readiness to benefit’ may 
imply changes to the process of selection and will certainly require systematic 
reviews of progress and a mechanism for removing an offender from the 
programme if it becomes clear that they are failing to benefit from it .
ii)  Relationship with ‘mainstream’ policing
A constant theme throughout our research has been the extent to which IOM can 
act as a model for policing more generally .  While some still consider IOM to be a 
specialism that requires different qualities and skills from other forms of policing, 
others consider it to be very close to good neighbourhood policing .  From 
management and political perspectives, one of the ways in which the resources 
allocated to IOM can be justified is for the principles of the work to be widely 
disseminated within the police service and to be integrated into other areas 
of work:
I absolutely think that it should be mainline that police are 
doing [IOM] .  Whichever way you look at it, it’s a win-win 
scenario (Police) .
But, as one partner agency manager pointed out, IOM is not the only form of 
multi-agency work, MAPPA being the best-established other example .  If, as was 
suggested earlier, IOM represents the ‘acute’ end of the medical spectrum, there 
is a danger that expectations of IOM will outstrip its specific model and that it 
will be stretched to such an extent that it becomes compromised and ineffective:
Yes, a multi-agency approach to addressing [gangs] might well 
be the right way to go about it .  Just as a multiagency approach 
to many problems might be the right way to go about it…but 
that doesn’t mean that IOM should be the means by which it is 
delivered (Probation) .
I think having different disparate cohorts of people just confuses 
the message and confuses the philosophy of what’s being tried 
to achieve really (Probation) .
iii)  Future of probation under Transforming Rehabilitation 
Since the interim stage of this research, the Probation Service nationally has 
been split into two organisations – NPS and 21 CRCs – with the latter being 
prepared to be sold off to the voluntary and private sectors .  The current 
situation for probation workers could hardly be worse and they have an 
uncertain future in the IOM, which has been designated as CRC work . This in 
itself implies that offenders on IOM programmes (nationally)  are assessed as 
being of medium or low risk of re-offending and/or causing serious harm .  While 
it is anticipated that most offenders on the Staffordshire programmes will fall 
into these categories, some will not and it is not yet clear how the NPS (dealing 
with high risk offenders) will be resourced to deal with these .  As we know, risk 
is also a dynamic concept and many IOM offenders will change their levels of 
risk during their time on the programme . The NPS also has sole responsibility 
for enforcement in relation to statutory cases, so the relationship between NPS 
and CRC will be critical for continued probation involvement in IOM .  During 
the transitional period, NPS staff have been available on site but this may not 
continue indefinitely . The ratio of statutory to non-statutory cases will also 
change, with the former increasing as offenders serving under 12 months in 
prison become automatically subject to supervision .  
Although the prime contractors for the CRC have now been named, this is only 
the beginning of a lengthy process of setting up the frameworks for partnership-
and inter-agency work . It is difficult to envisage how a privately-owned CRC  will 
work in this environment .  Contractual issues around the physical co-location of 
a private sector-led organisation in a police station would appear to be complex .  
Equally, the relationships between a private sector-led  CRC and other existing 
partner agencies from the voluntary and health sectors pose special challenges .  
These issues reach well beyond the remit of our research but we find it difficult 
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to see a future for IOM without highlighting the extreme turbulence that 
probation workers are currently experiencing:
It’s very resource intensive…but a contract that is partially 
payment by results – however comfortable a private sector 
organisation feels with our multiagency working or partnership 
working, they would potentially see as well, if they’ve got to 
rely for their results on the performance of others, when they 
have no control over that performance, then is that a dangerous 
place to be?(Probation) .
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Chapter 5  
Performance data and other statistics 
As indicated earlier, it is proving very difficult for IOM programmes nationally to 
demonstrate their effectiveness in terms of providing hard statistical evidence of 
reduced re-offending .  In this section we report on the ways in which the IOM in North 
Staffordshire is attempting to address this .  Given the unclear national picture, we 
believe that these efforts are commendable and, more importantly, there is active 
discussion at every level about how the data can be improved .
The case management software used by the Staffordshire police (and thus by the 
IOM programme) is ECINS and this generates a wealth of both static and dynamic 
information about individual offenders . But, like all software, it is only as reliable as 
the information entered and, in the case of the IOM, it is dependent on the quality of 
intelligence from IOM workers .  We have, for example, already noted that probation 
officers do not contribute to ECINS .
With these caveats, we have focussed on two sources of statistical data:
•	 Local IOM Performance Dashboard generated centrally which provides periodic 
statistical trends for management
•	 A randomly generated sample of 30 offenders participating in the IOM 
programme in the North as of February 2014 
Performance Dashboard
The methodology used to generate the Dashboard snapshots has changed during the 
course of our evaluation, so it has not been possible to make comparisons over time .  
Additionally, there has been a comprehensive management review of the statistical 
data collected by  IOM with a view to utilising a model that will capture outcomes other 
than crude re-offending rates more appropriately .  We have attended two management 
meetings on this specific topic and have been able to contribute to this discussion .  
Consequently, we do not consider it appropriate to present the existing data here, other 
than to say that, in the broadest terms and using the most recent methodology, the  rate 
for IOM in the North is approximately 2% lower than the national average for PPOs and 
across Staffordshire is approximately 4 .5% lower than the national average .
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ECINS random sample report
In our interim report, we explained that we were monitoring the risk assessment 
progress over 6 months of a randomly generated sample of 30 IOM offenders (roughly 
10% of all IOM offenders and 1 in 7 of those not in prison) .  The sample comprises 
a mix of all categories identified earlier in this report .  Only one is female and two 
are juveniles; the remainder are adult males . In February the sample consisted of 16 
Red (High), 9 Amber (Medium) and 5 Green (Low) offenders . Cross-referencing with 
official (Performance Dashboard) figures, it is clear that our sample over-represents 
Red offenders and under-represents Green offenders .  We decided not to adjust the 
sample to make it more representative but we note that any positive changes in the risk 
assessment of our sample indicate progress with the ‘hardest to reach’ offenders .  As we 
explain later, we have supplemented this data in various ways to focus more on Green 
and de-selected offenders whose progress is, by definition, generally more positive .
In our interim report we presented the early results of this exercise because we felt that 
they were going to generate considerable debate and would require further exploration .  
This has proved to be the case .  As the table in Appendix 3 indicates, the risk assessment 
for many offenders fluctuates, sometimes wildly .  As a result of the feedback we have 
received since our interim report, we have now taken account of the changes in the 
number and types of arrest and prison sentences for each participant, two years prior 
to their selection for IOM and since their selection .  This has given us a more detailed 
picture of changes in the offender’s behaviour .  Overall, we remain satisfied that the 
risk assessment score is a reasonable proxy for changes in behaviour .  However, it is 
necessary to take into account the following when interpreting the score:
•	 The risk assessment score can only ever be a guide to changing behaviour 
because it is dependent on the quality and assessment of the information/ 
intelligence provided by IOM workers .  It is also worth noting that, when 
intelligence is not provided over a period of time, the software makes an 
automatic re-assessment of risk .
•	 Changes to the risk assessment score may not reflect re-offending or even re-
arrest . ‘Soft’ intelligence about changes in behaviour, personal circumstances, 
aspects of sentence planning and failures to comply will also affect the score .
•	 Imprisonment may not reflect a recent pattern of re-offending .  It may be the 
delayed consequence of a past pattern of offending or it may be a recall to 
prison for failure to comply with a court order .  The latter ‘breach’ proceedings 
instigated by probation officers could be interpreted as a timely preventative 
measure to stem further offending and allow a breathing space to review an 
offender’s sentence plan .  Bearing in mind that IOM is about both ‘change’ and 
‘control’, imprisonment should not automatically be viewed as an indicator of 
failure (though this does make it almost impossible to provide clear performance 
indicators of success) .
Taking account of all the above, it appears to us that approximately half of our sample 
has succeeded in lowering their risk assessment score over the 6 month monitoring 
period and half has a raised score .  The additional pre- and post-IOM arrest data broadly 
support this conclusion .  
However, as previously stated, our sample over-represents high risk offenders and only 
two of our sample were de-selected for good progress . In order to get a clearer picture 
of Green offenders, we asked the programme to provide anecdotal information about 
their ‘success stories’ and it was readily forthcoming .  It is clear that where the IOM 
‘works’, it works very well and it is thus understandable that workers are frustrated by 
an overall statistical picture that does not seem to reflect what they know to be the case 
on the frontline .  In the next section we turn to possible explanations for this apparent 
disparity and present some ‘good news’ case studies .
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Chapter 6   
Who benefits from IOM? Case studies and 
categories of offenders 
Throughout the research we have been conscious of a need to identify those offenders 
who benefit most from IOM and to offer some suggestions about why that might be 
so .  In this section we identify four categories of offenders for whom IOM has impacted, 
in different ways and for different reasons .  In each category we present an illustrative 
case study from the people we have met . In compiling the case studies we have used 
a combination of data from our own interviews, ECINS, police debrief interviews and 
discussions with offender managers .
Category 1: Last chance before custody
This group consists of offenders who tend to be younger and are beginning their 
criminal careers .  With the right intervention at the right time they can be diverted from 
custody and supported until they mature sufficiently to become responsible adults . 
Craig is an example .  Aged 19, he started offending when he was 13 and got in with the 
‘wrong crowd’ .  By 15 he was smoking cannabis and committing thefts and burglaries . 
Living with his grandmother and mother, who has a drink problem and a criminal record 
herself, Craig has been an IOM participant for 8 months .  He has never been to prison 
and he knows the IOM is his last chance .  He has kept out of court in that time .  His main 
problem is that he has never worked .  The IOM has motivated him to get a job and he 
attends the weekly computer class at the public library run by the IOM where he has 
been able to obtain a CSCS card, enabling him to work on a building site with a friend of 
his uncle . This group of offenders highlights the importance of working closely with the 
Youth Offending Service to ensure that young people are fully supported in their early 
teenage years and that their transition to adult status is carefully managed .
Category 2: Prison regulars finally ready to change
The most dramatic changes are to be found in this group of older offenders who have 
spent many years in and out of prison and have finally decided that they can’t face 
another custodial sentence .  They are ready to change and the IOM is the right vehicle 
to bring about that change . Damon is an example .  A heroin addict with 18 convictions 
when he joined IOM (half of which were for failure to comply with court orders), Damon 
had been on prolific offender programmes before but ‘hated it with a passion, refused 
to do it, refused to go in, so they’d just send me back to prison’ .  In sum, he said ‘I wasn’t 
ready to change’ .  But having reached suicidal ‘rock bottom’, he was persuaded by IOM 
officers to go into a residential drug rehabilitation programme .  Since then he has gone 
from strength to strength and is now working as a volunteer with the rehab programme .  
He has not been arrested since the end of 2012 and has now been de-selected .  He has 
acted as an ambassador for IOM, telling his story to rooms full of police officers and 
partner agencies .  
More ‘good news stories’ in this category include:
Dave, who set himself goals on release from prison to lose weight, keep off drugs and 
stay crime free .  With the support of IOM field officers, he achieved all three by joining the 
IOM boxing project, culminating in him participating in a police charity boxing match in 
front of 1000 police officers .  Now a boxing tutor and volunteer, he has stopped offending 
and has been de-selected from the IOM .  His offender manager reports that ‘this is a 
massive change from the chaotic offender I first met’ .
Bob has found the journey more difficult and his reduction in offending has been steady 
rather than dramatic . Another heroin addict, he was eventually supported away from 
the drug scene by IOM field officers and his own partner .  A family man with 3 children, 
he has been de-selected because he has not been arrested for a year .  The combined 
support of Social Services, probation, drugs treatment and field officers has led to a 
better lifestyle and a crime-free existence .
Category 3: Vulnerable non-copers
A large number of offenders on IOM could be described as ‘vulnerable non-copers’ . They 
live chaotic lives and are dependent on the support offered by all the partner agencies, 
especially drugs treatment and housing .  Their probation and police IOM and field 
officers are their only consistent means of support and, while the impact of IOM on their 
offending may be rather hit and miss, it could certainly be argued that they would be 
worse – both personally and criminally – without it .  Lisa is an example and one of the 
few women on IOM .  Lisa is a compulsive shoplifter who started committing crime when 
she was 16 to support her boyfriend’s drug habit .  The relationship was abusive and Lisa 
says she ‘never really wanted to do crime’ but she ‘just wanted to help’ her boyfriend .  
Intelligent and well-presented, Lisa easily passed for a regular shopper but, at the age 
of 21, she has already served four prison sentences .  Poignantly, her view of the local 
women’s prison was:
To be honest, I never wanted to come home from that prison .  It just 
feels like a proper home when you’re in that prison .
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At the time of interview, Lisa was living in accommodation provided by the IOM 
programme .  She has been signposted by the IOM to a local one-stop shop provision 
for women, where she enjoys a range of activities and has even begun to work as a 
volunteer .  Her former boyfriend is now in prison and she has the opportunity to start 
afresh .  Her re-offending has reduced but not stopped .  Her last prison sentence was a 
year ago, before she became an IOM participant .
Lisa has been de-selected recently in response to a policy move to create capacity to 
address the local issue of gangs . Fortunately, she is a statutory offender so will retain the 
support of probation .  
Category 4: Not yet ready to change
The ‘carrot and stick’ ethos of IOM means that even those offenders who are not yet 
ready to change can be ‘controlled’ by the IOM .  Difficult to engage in any meaningful 
way, they can nevertheless be monitored and quickly re-arrested if they re-offend .  IOM 
officers continue to offer support but inevitably find these offenders frustrating to work 
with .  Gavin, whose case study was presented in our interim report, is one such .  Having 
been on prolific offender programmes for years, he has been ready to accept the offer 
of support in between prison sentences but has been unable to make any significant 
changes in his life and re-offends whenever he feels under pressure .  Since our interim 
report he has received yet another custodial sentence and is in prison at the time of 
writing .  While there is no doubt that offenders like Gavin have benefitted in some ways 
from the IOM, it could be argued that the resources invested in him over many years 
are hard to justify .  On the other hand, the only alternative is for Gavin to receive a 
continuous stream of short custodial sentences that are more costly in the long run .
It is clear from these case studies that there is no ‘typical’ IOM offender .  At the moment, 
IOM offenders have their offences in common – serious acquisitive crime (SAC) – but 
we are not convinced that the specific nature of the offence is the key to impact .  Many 
IOM offenders have mixed offence records and, while SAC dominates, there is also plenty 
of public order offences and lower level violence .  More important, we suggest, are the 
dispositions, personal circumstances and stages of criminal development of offenders .  
The key question is ‘Are they ready to benefit from IOM?’  While acknowledging that 
making this assessment is far from simple, it does suggest a need for much greater focus 
on selection, progress and de-selection processes than currently exists .
Chapter 7   
Cost Analysis
We have provided a simple ‘cost analysis’ based on an economic evaluation that deals 
only with the costs of interventions .  This is the most basic valuation exercise which can 
only represent:
(i)  known inputs (recorded interventions);
(ii)  service inputs which have been monetised, and for which there is an 
approximate cost (for example, the cost of an arrest);
(iii)  the average cost of interventions (such as being arrested), but not the actual 
cost of interventions with respect to individual service users . 
This approach also excludes ‹additionalities› such as loss of property; victim costs; costs 
to NHS; or other non-monetised inputs .  Therefore, the cost information is imperfect .
Methodology:
This section makes use of case studies to set out the basic costs and potential areas of 
saving which may be associated with interventions under the IOM programme . By using 
case studies, we can set out more detail about the interventions that offenders receive 
and also give information about possible outcomes . Estimations are based on ‘the public 
sector cost of crime’, that is, the costs to the taxpayer of responding to, investigating, 
processing and punishing crimes and breaches .  Costs of interventions are set against 
costs to the police, courts, probation service and the Safer City partnership . This is then 
compared with a ‘value for money’ calculation (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2007) .  The 
‘value for money’ formula describes the net saving that can accrue per offender on the 
programme when compared with the costs of sending them to prison . 
Value for money compared to prison per offender. 
The Matrix calculation [5] is one useful source for comparing savings achieved by 
placing offenders on non-custodial alternative programmes instead of prison .  The Matrix 
model aggregates the costings of complex interventions or treatment programmes for 
the duration of a year, such as ‘residential drug treatment’ .  This is then set against the 
predicted cost savings arising from reduced reoffending post-release .  The resulting 
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savings are modelled on the basis of the reduced re-offending as a result of successful 
completion (taking into account the cost of the intervention) over an offender’s post-
release lifetime .   If costs are modelled to reflect savings to property and victim costs, 
the projected savings are even more significant .  For the purposes of comparison, the 
IOM programme is costed as an ‘intensive supervision programme’ .
Non-custodial intervention 
(annual cost)
Saving to public 
purse
Savings plus fewer victim 
and property costs
Intensive supervision programme £57,364 £130,477
Residential drug treatment £88,469 £202,775
Prison with drug treatment £31,959 £116,554
Juvenile community interventions £3,437 £16,260
Note: all costs are estimates (Matrix, 2007) .
Case study A
‘A’ was inducted into the Integrated Offender Management programme in May 2012 
after having spent 182 days in prison . He had initially turned to crime to fund his heroin 
dependency . Prior to engaging with IOM, ‘A’ had 18 convictions for failure to comply 
with court orders, drug possession and theft . ‘‘A’ had experienced homelessness and 
substance abuse .  He engaged constructively with IOM field officers, his last court order 
passed without issue and his probation officer was very supportive . 
On engaging with IOM, ‘A’ accepted a place onto a residential drug rehabilitation 
programme with the Burton Addiction Centre (BAC) . Up to that point, ‘A’ was sofa 
surfing with associates, drinking heavily and barely surviving . ‘A’ entered the BAC 
and began his recovery . He was visited throughout his stay by probation and police 
field officers . ‘A’ left the BAC in March 2014 and has never looked back .  ‘A’ ceased his 
offending and is now working as a volunteer with Recovery Is Out There (R .I .O .T), giving 
back to the community and contributing his time as a peer mentor to offenders .  His 
case can be regarded as a success story for the IOM programme . 
‘A’ is one of the less resource-intensive clients of IOM .  However, we do not have 
a full profile of all of the services he accessed .  We have conservatively costed his 
interventions . Future costing exercises will require a more complete picture of services 
and resources accessed . 
‘A’ has now successfully exited the IOM programme .  The table above suggests that the 
known costs for his offending (arrests and detention) was an estimated £48,796 .  His 
interventions (IOM supervision and drug treatment) cost £11,246, although this only 
factors in the known services accessed .  The table highlights a difference of £37,550 if ‘A 
‘had continued to commit crime or received a custodial sentence . 
Intervention  
(pre IOMs) Number of occurrences Unit cost Total
Prison costs 182 days in prison custody
Based on average 
annual cost of a prison 
place for financial year 
2011-12 (£37,648)[1]
£18,772
Number of arrests
18 Based on number of 
convictions prior to IOM 
programme
£1,668 (based on 
marginal operating 
costs) [2]
£30,024
Cost £48,796
Intervention  
(post IOMs) Number of occurrences Unit cost Total
IOM field officers/
probation
supervision
May 2012 to March 2014 £5,947 per offender per year . [3] £5,947
Residential drug 
treatment
Length of time not 
known . Estimated 
one year .
£5,299 per offender per 
year . [4] £5,299
Cost £11,246
Case study B
In the two years prior to joining the IOM programme, ‘B’ had moved address several 
times, smoked heroin almost daily and committed crime to fund his habit . He was 
extremely chaotic and difficult to engage .  He was arrested 22 times for offences ranging 
from theft, burglary, car theft, possession of drugs and warrants for non-appearance 
before the courts . He had spent three terms in prison in that period, totalling 250 days 
before opting for IOM on exit from this third period in custody . ‘B’ currently resides in the 
community with his partner . 
His field officer managed to stay in touch with ‘B’ and on several occasions worked 
with him to change over a period of time .  ‘B’ has three children . Social services were 
also involved with the family due to ‘B’s drug use and the risks of losing custody of his 
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children made him engage with the IOM process . ‘B’ received support with his drugs 
misuse, benefits advice, social services and housing . In the nine months after going on 
the IOM programme ‘B’ was arrested 14 times, mainly for theft and failure to attend 
drug assessments . He also spent two terms in prison, for 124 days in total . He lapsed 
into periods of drug misuse but eventually became less chaotic, sticking to methadone 
prescriptions and spending more time with his family . 
After moving in with his partner and children, ‘B’ had all but cleared up his drug habit, 
his criminal activity decreased and he disassociated himself from peers involved in 
drug use and offending .  Both ‘B’ and his partner gained CSCS (Construction Skills 
Certification Scheme) qualifications .  At this time ‘B’ was deselected from IOM and 
although contact was lost, he is still in the area and there have been no reports of 
criminal activity for some time .
‘B’ has now disengaged from the IOM programme but with evidence that he has 
largely turned the corner .  The table above suggests that the known costs for his 
offending (arrests and detention) in the two years prior to engagement with IOMs was 
an estimated £62,922 .  His interventions (IOM supervision, drug treatment and family 
support costs) came to £11,985 . He spent a period under arrest and in custody after 
selection to IOMs which amounted to £36,422 . 
The table highlights a difference of £14,515 if ‘B’ had continued to commit crime at the 
rate and severity of his offending pre-IOMs .  However, it must be noted that the biggest 
expense related to the custody and arrest disposals which were significantly reduced 
after nine months, evidently as a result of investment in addiction and family services 
which are supporting B’s longer-term journey from crime . 
Intervention 
pre-IOMs
Number of 
occurrences Unit cost Total
Prison costs 250 days £37,648 per year £25,786
Number of 
arrests 22 £1,668 £37,136
£62,922
Intervention 
(post IOMs)
Number of 
occurrences Unit cost Total
Social 
Services n/a
Initial contact and referral: £186
Initial assessment: £271
Ongoing support per child: £107 x 3 
(£321)
Core assessment: £585
Planning and reviewing: £222
Public law guardianship costs: £2238 . [6]
£3,823
Drug/
Alcohol 
intervention 
Weekly drug 
assessments 
(excluding 
period in 
custody) = 35 
weeks .
£53 per week for prescription service x 
35 weeks (£1,855)
£120 per session for combined drugs/
alcohol /mental health team assessments 
(monthly) x 3 (£360) . [7]
£2,215
IOM field 
officers/
probation 
supervision
£5,947 per year . £5,947
Prison costs 124 days  £37,648 per year . £12,790
Number of 
arrests 14 £1,668 £23,632
Full total  £48,407
Sources: (1) Ministry of Justice (2012) Costs per place and costs per prisoner 
by individual prison, NOMS Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12: Management 
Information Addendum . 
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(2) Ministry of Justice (2013) Information Release: Costs per place and costs per 
prisoner . p2-3 .
(3), (4), (5) Matrix Knowledge Group (2007) The economic case for and against 
prison . p7 .
(6) Holmes, L ., McDermid, S ., Soper, J ., Sempik, J ., & H . Ward .  (2010) Extension of the 
cost calculator to include cost calculations for all children in need . Research Brief: DFE – 
RB056 .  University of Leicester . p7
(7) Homeless Watch (2013) What’s it Worth?  Guidance on using financial savings analysis 
in the homelessness sector . P24 .
Conclusion
Simple cost analysis is only a foundation for actuarial modelling which allows 
service purchasers to determine the ‘cost benefit’ of a service, that is, measuring the 
effectiveness and efficiency of an intervention in relation to investment .  ‘Cost benefit 
analysis’ relies on econometric projections to determine whether investment in a given 
service produces worthwhile outputs or even savings . Cost benefit analysis is a valuable 
tool for eliciting transparency and accountability in public services .  However, experts 
argue that there are numerous pitfalls and limitations to estimating the monetary 
value of costs and benefits of criminal justice interventions (see Albertson and Fox, 
2012) .  These can be summarised as  (i) the practical constraints of capturing complex 
interactions; (ii) imperfect cost information; (iii) failure of policy makers to ask the 
right questions; (iv) over-reliance on ‘an aura of precision and objectivity [in economic 
modelling] that might not be justified’  (Cohen, 2000: 303) ; (v) the misapplication of 
benefit-cost analysis; (vi) difficulties in capturing ‘unknown’ values such  as possible 
‘savings’ accrued to society if an individual is returned to custody, thus ‘preventing’ 
further offences .
The accuracy of costing relies on the quality of information about services accessed, 
length of time spent on interventions, and other relevant data .  Cost-benefit analysis 
works most efficiently when it is deployed in relation to clear policy objectives .  
Commissioners or service purchasers within IOM may choose to make greater use of 
the Ministry of Justice toolkit or obtain expert econometric evaluations of the impact 
of the project in order to obtain a detailed picture of the impact, value, outcomes and 
savings accrued .  
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Chapter 8   
Conclusions and recommendations 
If we adopt the following standard model for mapping the various components of 
programme evaluation, we are now in a position to draw some conclusions and make 
some  recommendations in all areas:
Inputs Activities Outputs Outcomes Impacts
Adapted from Pawson (2013)
We have ample evidence of the process of IOM:  inputs (staff, physical environment, 
financial and technological resources, information exchange); activities (programmes, 
appointments, support, surveillance, purposeful leisure activities, skills training); 
and outputs (intelligence, partnership development, individual offender profiles, risk 
assessment and social progress) .  As will be clear from this report, this evidence has 
been overwhelmingly positive .  We have met enthusiastic, committed workers from 
all involved agencies, who believe passionately in IOM and can present compelling 
rationales for, and descriptions of, their work .  We have been particularly impressed by 
their tenacity and willingness to persevere with damaged, chaotic offenders and in the 
face of limited resources, organisational uncertainty and cramped working conditions .  
The complexity of the programme has resulted in inevitable tensions and lack of clarity 
around the roles and responsibilities of different agencies but these are being resolved 
professionally .  Being optimistic and able to tolerate a degree of uncertainty is a pre-
requisite of this kind of work .
We also have ample evidence of strategic planning and commitment to the IOM at very 
senior levels within both police and probation services .  This is not necessarily the case 
nationally and undoubtedly gives the Staffordshire IOM model credibility externally .
We would identify the following as specific areas of good practice:
•	 The role of field officers in acting as a link between the IOM unit, partner 
agencies and the local policing team .  Despite (or possibly because of) the 
ambiguity of the role, the relationships that field officers are able to establish 
with offenders result in a range of benefits for all partners, such as intelligence, 
safeguarding, early identification of problems and crime prevention .  This work 
is particularly valuable where it is possible for field officers to make joint home 
visits with probation workers and other partners .  We are not convinced that this 
complex role could easily be replaced by volunteer or peer mentors, though the 
latter have an important but separate contribution to make .
•	 The proportion of imprisoned IOM offenders who have been housed in 
Staffordshire and West Midlands prisons .  This has been an impressive 
achievement and one that has been due to the commitment of specific senior 
personnel in both the police and prison services .  It has given a real impetus to 
the concept and practice of resettlement .  
•	 The practice of collecting offenders on their release from prison .  The value of 
this seemingly minor practice should not be overlooked .  Notwithstanding our 
comments about the field officer role, we think that this particular practice could 
be fulfilled by mentors – especially ex-offender peer mentors -  who could guide 
a newly released offender through the maze of first day appointments and help 
to settle them in accommodation .
•	 The creation and regular updating of ECINS profiles .  The use of ECINS software 
has enabled the systematic collection of data on individuals on the IOM 
programme . It provides a wealth of useful information but needs to be constantly 
updated for its value to persist .  While fully understandable, it is disappointing 
that probation is unable to contribute and we would like to see other partners 
making more contributions .  We would also like to see a greater use of ECINS to 
produce aggregated reports on trends .
•	 The development of debriefing interviews .  Although the quality of the debrief 
reports varies, the ability of IOM police officers to conduct and report on 
interviews with offenders about their motivations and modus operandi for crime 
is an excellent aid to both police intelligence and police understanding of the 
personal circumstances of offenders . We remain unclear about the use to which 
these reports are put and ask, for example, whether they would be useful to 
probation officers in the preparation of court reports .
•	 The IT skills classes held at a local public library and the boxing project .  We 
would identify these two projects as examples of good practice in using local 
resources to respond to local problems .  Additionally, the projects provide 
specific benefits respectively of preparing offenders for employment and 
improving their physical and mental health .
•	 Housing is prioritised as a precondition to securing the basis for constructive 
work with prolific offenders .  Housing providers are knowledgeable about the 
needs of people leaving custody and those with offending histories .  Equally, 
they are responsive towards the particular risks that inappropriate housing 
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presents for increasing the likelihood of re-offending .  They remain constrained 
by shortages of accommodation for single persons in the general housing stock, 
but also identified the need for special capabilities and authority to secure 
urgent housing needs for  acutely difficult tenants .
•	 Educational, Training and Employment (ETE) provision is fragmented .  This 
is a national problem . Local providers have taken the initiative in providing 
elementary preparation for independent living and purposeful activity, such 
as Building Skills for Recovery, Information Technology, work skills, victim 
empathy, football, and boxing .  Building from this to the acquisition of ‘hard’ 
skills such as qualifications, educational certification and employability skills is a 
challenge .  Attention to the local dimension and continuity in commissioning and 
procurement is recommended . 
•	 Drugs and alcohol misuse, often closely related to mental ill-health is a 
major cause of offending behaviour and obstacle to successful resettlement .  
Treatment and therapeutic approaches make a significant contribution to IOM, 
with community mental health and other providers, drugs and alcohol teams 
coordinating effectively and contributing to high levels of engagement .
•	 The Post-Implementation Review and its follow-up .  This review, undertaken 
internally in 2013, provides an impressively detailed picture of the early days 
of the IOM .  Its ambitious methodology is more rigorous than the authors 
give themselves credit for and it has provided a very useful springboard for 
our own research . We are aware that the IOM Strategic Planning Group has 
been monitoring the actions following the 62 recommendations made by the 
Post-Implementation Review .  We have identified a small number of these 
recommendations to which our research has made a contribution and we 
have listed these in Appendix 4 .  They can be summarised here as falling into 
5 categories:
1 .  Clarifying roles and responsibilities across the multi-agency partnership
2 .  Promoting academic partnerships and methodologies in evaluating and 
developing the programme
3 .  Improving processes relating to progress of participants
4 .  Improving understanding of offender needs and services
5 .  Improving communications with wider community, courts and third 
sector organisations
At the interim stage, we had less evidence and therefore less confidence in the two 
areas of outcomes and impacts .  It is to these areas that we now turn . The evidence 
presented in this report indicates that where the IOM works, it works very well, both 
in improving the lives of persistent acquisitive criminals and in reducing their levels of 
re-offending .  More systematic collection of de-selection data would demonstrate this 
more convincingly .  But it does not work for everyone on the programme .  It is clear that 
many offenders are not ready for ‘change’ .  At present, this does not mean that they are 
programme ‘failures’ because they can still be successfully ‘controlled’ .  However, this 
contradictory definition of programme success makes it all but impossible to produce 
the clear performance indicators that commissioners – and the general public – require . 
This is particularly pertinent at a time when the Police and Crime Commissioner is 
taking more responsibility for the structure and nature of multi-agency partnerships . 
Consequently, there is a need to review the aims and objectives of IOM to take account 
of this complexity . We suggest this discussion may result in a choice between two new 
future directions for IOM .
Direction 1:  IOM as ‘acute medicine’
•	 IOM is regarded as akin to acute medicine – a specific model of multi-agency 
work to which those with the most complex needs are assigned for a finite 
period of time before being moved to lower levels of support and/or control .
•	 Within this model, participants may be selected, in addition to their needs, not so 
much according to the nature of their offences but according to their ‘readiness 
to benefit’ from the programme . 
•	 We have suggested three different categories of offender who might be ready to 
benefit: those who are at risk of a first custodial sentence; those who are ‘burned 
out’ by years of prison sentences; and, the vulnerable non-copers who cannot 
avoid prison without support .
•	 We have suggested that a fourth category of those not ready to change should 
either not be selected for IOM or should be de-selected rapidly if they fail to 
engage with it at a minimum required level .
•	 If a concept of ‘readiness to benefit’ were incorporated into the selection process, 
this would have implications for offenders’ progress through the programme and 
their de-selection from it .
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Direction 2: IOM as a broad set of principles
•	 IOM is not the only model of multi-agency work and is not necessarily the best 
model for all cohorts of offenders .
•	 Nevertheless, the present model is underpinned by a set of key principles which 
could form the basis for the development of other models .
•	 There are also examples of good practice that could be rolled out for use in other 
partnership arrangements .
•	 However, moving in this direction, it would not be appropriate to simply apply 
the existing IOM model to a range of other situations .  Each new situation would 
require the fresh application of IOM principles and the development of fresh and 
apposite multi-agency interventions .
While there is much to commend it, the disadvantage of Direction 1 is that it will 
continue to be resource-intensive and require very carefully specified relationships 
between the partner agencies involved .  The impact of the entry of private sector 
organisations in this context is hard to predict .
The risk with Direction 2 is two-fold . There is a danger that lack of time, resources or 
good partnership communication could lead either to the existing model of IOM being 
over-stretched to the point of being overwhelmed or, alternatively, the key principles of 
IOM being diluted to the point where they are no longer meaningful .
Whichever direction IOM takes, there are a number of shorter-term recommendations 
that we would make on the basis of our findings which will enhance the programme’s 
ability to produce evidence of its success for internal and external audiences:
•	 The re-introduction of a series of formal periodic reviews involving partnership 
representation for all participants with a clear pathway to de-selection for both 
statutory and non-statutory participants .  De-selection to be a performance 
indicator of success .
•	 The collection of simple statistics on the recruitment, progress and de-selection 
of participants and production of regular accessible reports on this data 
(recognising that speedy re-arrest and re-conviction may also be an indicator 
of success) .
•	 The production of regular trend reports from ECINS data eg . in respect of 
risk assessment .
•	 A series of IOM staff meetings to support and monitor the impact of the changes 
resulting from Transforming Rehabilitation .
•	 The instigation of regular middle management partnership meetings to deal with 
programme development at the operational level between strategy and day-to-
day work .
•	 The development of an internal communications strategy to enable all partners 
to feel fully involved in programme developments .
•	 The development of an external communications strategy to ensure the 
dissemination of good practice and good news to external audiences .
•	 Drawing up an Action Plan that will identify tasks, responsibilities and timescales 
across the partnership for addressing this report and its recommendations .
Whilst we have not explicitly addressed the issue of early intervention in this report, it 
is clear that certain elements of the IOM approach have as much to do with targeted 
interventions for improving the life chances of individuals who are prolific offenders 
as with addressing their offending .  This combined (or ‘holistic’) approach is based on 
cumulative research which demonstrates that appropriately-placed social supports are 
pre-conditions to diverting, or supporting, individuals out of criminal involvement .  In 
this sense, IOM resembles an enabling approach rather than a simple, predictive tool 
of offending .  Nevertheless, the programme has been robust where it has utilised the 
following:  clear criteria for selection (informed by the categories we have identified 
relating to offenders’ readiness or not to engage); carefully specified interventions; 
agreed principles of targeted intervention; co-ordinated and apposite multi-agency 
work; and the understanding that interventions are likely to be more resource-intensive 
at initial stages in anticipation that these will ameliorate as medium- and longer-term 
goals of reducing reoffending are attained .
Anne Worrall and Mary Corcoran
30 October 2014 
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APPENDIX 1  
Complexity checklist from Pawson, R. 
(2013) The Science of Evaluation: a Realist 
Manifesto (London: Sage) Chapter 3
1. Volitions. Map the choice architecture of the programme . What choices do subjects 
have to make to achieve the ambitions of the programme? These choices will vary 
significantly across the totality of subjects, so the map should cover the full range and 
balance of volitions . Minds tend to be changed slowly so the volition map should also 
sketch the pathways of persuasion, the sequence of choices a subject has to make in 
moving from outsider to insider status . 
2. Implementation. Map the implementation chains of the programme . Programmes 
come to life over many months and years and a great diversity of ‘traffic’ flows 
through them . Implementation maps might begin to chart: flows of resources; chains 
of responsibilities (individuals and institutions); reception and transmission points for 
subjects; as well as the different theories-of-change that lie behind each stage, strategy 
and tactic .
3. Contexts. Map the pre-existing contexts in which the programme is embedded . 
Consider for whom and in what circumstances the programme might work . Contexts 
vary from the micro to the macro, so the map might include profiles of: stakeholders 
and their characteristics; the interpersonal exchanges through which the programme is 
delivered; the organisational settings in which it takes place; the wider societal location 
of the programme .
4. Time. Map the history of the family of programmes of which the intervention under 
study is a member . What has happened previously will shape what happens next . 
Temporal mapping might include; previous experiences of programme subjects and 
communities on similar interventions; previous experience of stakeholders in delivering 
similar interventions; the successes and failures of previous attempts, of whatever kind, 
to address the given policy objective . 
5. Outcomes. Map the monitoring systems that are likely to be applied and have been 
applied to programmes like the one under study . Consider which measures are likely 
to be contested, how stakeholders might differ in their interpretations, and whether 
behaviour might change as a result of being monitored rather than as a result of the 
intended action of the programme .
6. Rivalry.  Map the pre-existing policy landscape in which the programme is embedded . 
Other, contiguous programmes and policies may share or oppose the ambitions of the 
intervention under study and can override the actions of stakeholders and subjects 
under study . Consider how generic implementation strategies such as ‘continuous 
improvement’ will continue to modify the delivery of the programme .
7. Emergence. Map the potential emergent effects, long-term adaptations, societal 
changes and unintended consequences associated with the programme . Consider 
whether the spread and duplication of the programme might blunt its effectiveness . 
How will the programme be able to maintain a balance between recruitment, retention 
and exit? 
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APPENDIX 2 
Intensive supervision for adult offenders1 in 
England and Wales: a literature review 
Anne Worrall and Rob Mawby2
For more than a decade, the government in England and Wales has insisted that a 
very small proportion of offenders (around 10 per cent) are committing a very large 
proportion of crime (around 50 per cent) at any point in time (Home Office 2001, 2003, 
2004) . Although this received wisdom has been challenged (Hopkins and Wickson 2013) 
it is in this context that we focus in this chapter on intensive supervision projects for 
persistent and prolific offenders (hereafter referred to as PPO projects) .  The underlying 
principle of such projects is that a combination of greater control and surveillance, 
together with help and treatment, offers the best opportunity to reduce the risk of 
re-offending of this group of predominantly young, male, non-violent offenders . The 
main criticisms of the projects are that they are resource-intensive, expensive and 
unproven . Evaluations, though increasing in number, are based on small samples and are 
inconclusive in their results . At the same time these projects represent an imaginative 
and alternative opportunity for the effective management of this specific group of 
offenders, whom agencies commonly have difficulties in engaging .
The structure of the review is as follows . First, we place PPO projects within their 
historical context . Secondly, we identify key common characteristics of PPO projects . 
Thirdly, we examine the evaluation of the projects, drawing out the main findings, and 
issues that have arisen to date . Finally, we draw a number of conclusions about the 
future of PPO projects and intensive supervision more generally in the context of the 
government’s radical plans for the probation service . 
1  We have excluded discussion of intensive supervision for juvenile offenders because this has an exten-
sive and separate history .
2  This review is adapted from a book chapter written in 2013 which has been translated into French for 
publication in a French edited collection .
Four generations of intensive supervision
Intensive projects for prolific and persistent offenders in England and Wales can be 
viewed as both a recent innovation - emerging from the convergence of intelligence-led 
policing and evidence-based probation, modelled on a European initiative3 and given 
impetus by the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act – and as the latest incarnation of a much 
older penal pre-occupation with persistent offending and intensive supervision . In order 
to understand the challenges and benefits of the projects, it is necessary to locate them 
within both short and longer term historical perspectives . 
In England and Wales it is possible to identify four ‘generations’ of intensive supervision 
initiatives for adult offenders – those which developed in the 1970s, those which were a 
feature of the 1980s and early 1990s but which continue in various forms to the present 
time, those which have emerged in the late 1990s and are proliferating in the early years 
of the 21st century and, finally, the latest iteration – Integrated Offender Management . 
The ‘first generation’ of intensive supervision for adults emerged in the 1970s when 
four probation services participated in the now infamous Intensive Matched Probation 
and After-Care Treatment (IMPACT) experiment from 1972 to 1974  (Folkard et al . 1974 
& 1976) . Based on the traditional ‘treatment model’ of probation, IMPACT sought to 
provide ‘more social work, more counselling, more help’ (Mair 1997:65) to a small and 
select caseload of offenders, in the belief that greater frequency of treatment contact 
would rehabilitate offenders and reduce their criminal activity . The focus was on 
‘matching’ offenders with different personality and social problems to different kinds of 
probation intervention and there was virtually no mention within the model of involving 
any other agencies .  The evaluation reports were damning, apparently demonstrating 
that IMPACT participants were more, rather than less, likely to re-offend than non-
participants, and providing evidence in the UK to support Martinson’s claim (1974) in 
the USA (also based on evaluation of similar intensive supervision interventions) that 
‘nothing works’ .4 
In the 1980s, the ‘second generation’ of intensive supervision represented a response to 
pressures created by a demand for incarceration which exceeded prison capacity and 
a lack of respect for community penalties .  In England and Wales, the government’s 
Green Paper Punishment, Custody and the Community (1988a) and subsequent 
Action Plan for dealing with young adult offenders, Tackling Offending (1988b) led to 
3  In 1995 a prolific offending project involving both the police and probation services was established 
in Dordrecht, Holland . It purportedly reduced the number of domestic burglaries (by one-third) and 
became the inspiration behind a number of UK projects . 
4  As Raynor and Vanstone (2002) have since noted, IMPACT did appear to work well with one particular 
group - those with low criminal tendencies who perceived themselves to have many problems - offend-
ers who might now be described as ‘low-risk, high need’ .
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eight pilot Intensive Probation schemes which ran between 1990 and 1992 and were 
evaluated by the Home Office (Mair et al . 1994; Mair 1997) .  Unlike the first generation 
projects, these projects made many more demands on offenders and included the 
concept of surveillance .  Evaluations of intensive supervision projects were consistently 
discouraging in terms of their impact on recidivism . Evaluators (Mair et al .1994) also 
bemoaned the ‘lack of innovation’ in the schemes .  In their favour, it was clear that 
offenders themselves spoke very positively of the projects, enjoying the additional 
attention .  The projects were also successful in providing greater control or structure for 
offenders and thus making it more likely that they would persevere with – and possibly 
benefit from – treatment projects .
Although intensive supervision projects failed to meet their stated goals, it has been 
noted that they achieved a ‘series of latent goals’ (Tonry 1990, cited in Mair 1997:67) 
– organisational, professional and psycho-political .  They enhanced the credibility of 
probation by appearing to demonstrate a ‘change of culture’ and a ‘reduced tolerance 
of crime and disorder’ .  This, in turn, attracted more resources to probation and raised 
the esteem – and self-esteem – of probation officers .  As Clear (1997:130) puts it, 
succinctly: ‘the very fact that intensive supervision projects proliferate is the evidence of 
their success’ .
The ‘third generation’ of Prolific and other Priority Offender (PPO) projects in England 
and Wales represent an amalgam of the theoretical underpinnings, policy objectives 
and multi-agency practices of previous generations of intensive supervision . Combining 
penal philosophies of deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation, these ‘third 
generation’ projects seek to provide a mix of frequent contact, access to treatment 
(particularly drugs treatment) and community facilities, and constant monitoring . They 
also seek to demonstrate cost-effectiveness and increased public safety .  The major 
departure from previous projects, however, is their avoidance of the pitfall of relying 
on offenders to reduce their own rates of re-offending .  This was always the weakest 
link in the chain and the one which consistently undermined claims of success .  Instead, 
it is now accepted that prompt re-arrest (resulting from increased intelligence and 
monitoring) following re-offending or recall for breach of sentence conditions is also a 
measure of success . There is, however, a serious flaw in this logic . The possibility that a 
project could claim success on the basis of arrests and order breaches does seem to be 
somewhat at odds with the spirit of the exercise and this conundrum is central to any 
understanding of the impact and contribution of such projects . It also makes evaluations 
rather complicated, as we shall see .
The latest or ‘fourth generation’ includes, but extends beyond, existing Prolific and other 
Priority Offender (PPO) projects (Home Office 2009) . Integrated Offender Management 
has been an attempt by the Ministry of Justice to provide a ‘strategic umbrella’ to co-
ordinate all multi-agency approaches to intensive supervision .  It has been an attempt 
to operationalise the concept of ‘end-to-end offender management’ introduced by the 
Carter Report (2003) with a key aim of ‘disrupting’ an offender’s criminal activity and 
thus reducing the risk of re-offending . Six pioneer sites were funded by the government 
in 2008/2009 and have been subject to evaluation (Senior et al . 2011) . Integrated 
Offender Management is now the nationally recognised framework for local multi-
agency collaboration in working with offenders (Ministry of Justice 2010) .
Key characteristics of intensive supervision and monitoring/ surveillance projects
Prolific offender projects for adult offenders were originally concerned with the 
reduction of volume property crime, predominantly theft and burglary, although more 
recent projects now accept offenders with some form of current or past violence in their 
records .  The central feature of such projects has been the combination of intensive 
attention from both the police and probation services . 
The other characteristics of the projects derive from this central feature .  First, the 
project is staffed by designated police and probation personnel, and located on either 
police or probation premises (the significance of different locations being as yet 
unevaluated) .  Secondly, participants in the project are required to meet local criteria 
that categorise them as ‘prolific’ - that is, among the most persistent offenders in the 
locality1 . Thirdly, they are subject to formal court orders of supervision or post-custodial 
licence though, importantly, IOM programmes now include substantial numbers of non-
statutory offenders who are not subject to current court orders . Fourthly, participants 
are subject to high levels of police monitoring2 and projects of intensive probation 
supervision which seek to address their offending behaviour and also to assist with 
other offending-related needs such as housing, substance misuse, leisure, education and 
employment . Fifthly, in order to achieve this, there has to be an agreed mechanism of 
information exchange between participating agencies (not just police and probation) . 
Finally, there is an agreed procedure for swift enforcement in the event of non-
compliance or further offending (which requires the co-operation of courts) .
The supervision regime 
Programmes of intensive supervision are the defining aspect of prolific offender 
projects . For example, on the Stoke-on-Trent project (Worrall et al . 2003), participants 
1  The official national definition of an adult persistent offender is now one who has been convicted of six 
recordable offences in a 12 month rolling period (which could include six offences on one occasion) . A 
prolific offender may be so defined on the basis of local intelligence .  However, definitions of prolific and 
persistent have become very flexible and one study now even questions the basic premise that a very 
small number of offenders commits a disproportionate amount of crime (Hopkins and Wickson 2013) . 
2  For a recent theoretical discussion of the surveillance of prolific offenders see McCahill and Finn (2013) .
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were bound to four weekly appointments that were arranged on an individual basis . 
Participants risked breach proceedings if they missed these appointments . They 
included: a weekly office visit, a weekly home visit, consultations with a substance 
abuse nurse and a doctor, employment/work assessment interviews, and ‘healthy 
lifestyle sessions . There were also occasional activities and a monthly Multi-Agency 
Planning and Assessment Meeting (MAPAM) . This comprised a formal monthly review 
of all participants . Chaired by a police chief inspector, the meetings were attended by 
agencies with an active involvement in the supervision of the participants . These had the 
purpose of reviewing progress with each participant against formal minuted targets that 
had been set at the previous meeting . If police intelligence had suggested suspicious 
sightings or associations, then the participant was challenged and required to provide 
an explanation . 
Commonly there were a greater number of contacts than the mandatory four . New 
participants, for example, required greater supervision initially . In addition, because 
the participants were, or had been, drugs users, their lifestyles were often chaotic . 
Consequently there were periods when a participant reached a crisis point and relied 
on the project team for intensive daily support . This support extended to participants’ 
families, whom team members worked with as one means of attempting to stabilise 
the participants .
The regime of intensive supervision involved the co-ordination and co-operation of 
many organisations, but the contributions of the health representatives were integral to 
the project . The doctor was a genuine team member and his role became increasingly 
influential, since all the participants had histories of drug misuse . Taking drugs did not 
mean that participants automatically breached their conditions for project participation, 
but it did influence their capacity to participate in activities, their ability to find 
work, and their relations with family and the project team . Therefore an early step in 
project participation was fast-tracking an appointment with the doctor, to address the 
stabilisation of the participants’ drugs use . This underpinned everything that followed, 
though it also raised criticisms of unfair priority being given to participants over law-
abiding citizens . 
The supervision regime described aspired to a framework of support that was different 
to other projects, providing a flexible, responsive service that drew on a range of 
specialists who would work on a one-to-one basis . Participants considered the project 
to be unlike their previous experiences of probation and community service . The 
differences they perceived related to the intensity of contact and the level of support 
from the project team . The participants were also in agreement that they valued the 
combination of the project’s different elements and activities . They perceived the project 
to have additional objectives to preventing re-offending, namely assisting reintegration 
into society and providing support across a range of areas, particularly helping with 
drugs problems .
In addition to supervising the participants’ lifestyles through the regime of 
appointments, the police would also monitor participants closely . A crime analyst 
constantly scanned for reported crimes that met the modus operandi of participants; 
incoming intelligence on their movements and associations was constantly reviewed, and 
the offenders continued to be watched carefully by local policing unit (LPU) officers . The 
level of monitoring was increased if participants behaved in a manner which suggested 
they were returning to offending . 
Evaluations
Hopkins and Wickson (2013) raise the question of testability in respect of PPO projects . 
They ask how success is measured and how it informs our knowledge of what works with 
offenders . Drawing on five national evaluations of projects, as well as their own smaller 
scale evaluation, they conclude that, while projects are ‘testable’ (and ‘tested’) credibly, 
pressure from the government for short-term solutions to long-term problems means 
that there has been very little follow-up of project participants and no evidence of 
significant long-term impact . They argue that projects offer opportunities for transition 
from offending to desistance but do not, of themselves, provide any ‘quick fixes’ .
For the past decade or more, one of the most influential methodological approaches to 
the evaluation of social and public policy provision has been that of realist evaluation 
(Pawson and Tilley 1997; Pawson 2013) .  This approach has resulted in the combination 
of both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and analysis and also the 
distinction between process and outcome evaluation .  The former focuses on the way in 
which new provision is implemented while the latter is concerned with more traditional 
‘findings’ or ‘results’ . Realist evaluation emphasises the complexity of interventions 
in the social world and demands that evaluations take account of the full range of 
factors that are likely to influence the success or failure of a programme . Pawson (2013) 
provides an extremely helpful ‘complexity checklist’ that covers inter alia  the choices, 
pathways, contexts, time-scales, contestations and unintended consequences that 
should form part of any attempt to evaluate a programme . This approach has proved 
popular with both evaluators and those responsible for programmes, but has been less 
popular with governments that desire quick and clear findings to inform their short-term 
funding decisions .
The body of evaluation research on projects for PPOs is neither large nor conclusive . 
However, the number of studies is increasing, comprising a mixture of independent 
evaluations by academics, often on a limited budget (Chenery and Pease 2000, Hope et 
al . 2001, Tupman et al . 2001, Abbas et al . 2003, Worrall et al 2003, Vennard and Pearce 
82 83
Integrated Offender Management Research Project - Final Report, October 2014 Integrated Offender Management Research Project - Final Report, October 2014
2004, Hopkins and Wickson 2013) and larger scale national or multi-site evaluations 
undertaken by Home Office and Ministry of Justice researchers (Homes et al . 2005, 
Dawson 2005, Dawson and Cuppleditch 2007, Senior et al . 2011) . Evaluators have 
typically had to work with small sample sizes and, in some cases, without a matched 
comparison group . The resulting reports and their conclusions tend to be highly 
qualified in relation to reduced offending and cost effectiveness . Nevertheless, many of 
the evaluations emerging in the UK have provided optimism that PPO projects can be 
effective in reducing the offending of the participant group (see, for example, Worrall 
et al .2003, Vennard and Pearce 2004, Dawson and Cuppleditch 2007) . This message, 
however tentatively expressed, has been politically expedient for governments . In 2009, 
the Ministry of Justice, drawing very selectively on Dawson and Cuppleditch’s research, 
declared that projects could result in a ‘62% reduction in recorded convictions over 17 
months’ (2009:6) .  This is by far the most optimistic finding of any project, though the 
overall direction of findings has been consistent over more than a decade .
However, PPO projects are complex in terms of their multi-agency nature and the 
needs of their clientele . Their value should be judged beyond crime rates and cost 
effectiveness, though these are of course important . Other criteria which should be 
taken into account include, on the one hand, health, educational and social benefits for 
participants and, on the other hand, improved multi-agency working and information 
exchange between project partners, and improved intelligence on prolific offenders .  
Participants in the Stoke-on-Trent project (Worrall and Mawby 2004:278) identified the 
following benefits:
•	 stopped or reduced their offending whilst they were on the project;
•	 kept them occupied;
•	 provided them with a sense of purpose;
•	 helped with their drugs problems;
•	 built their confidence in doing everyday things, e .g ., finding accommodation, 
dealing with the utility companies, social interaction; and 
•	 helped the rebuilding of relationships with families (partners, children 
and parents) .
From a theoretical perspective, projects might be judged on the basis of their 
contribution to ‘desistance’ from offending (Farrall et al . 2007) . Here there is a 
distinction to be made between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ desistance . The distinction 
defines ‘primary’ desistance as ‘any lull or crime-free gap’, whereas ‘secondary’ 
desistance involves ‘the assumption of a role or identity of a non-offender’ - becoming 
a ‘changed person’ .  Evaluations suggest that prolific/persistent offender projects 
at their best buttress ‘primary’ desistance and prepare an offender for ‘secondary’ 
desistance, but that the latter will only occur when other personal, social and economic 
factors are favourable . Projects working intensively with prolific offenders might be 
best regarded as being of a maintenance nature rather than a short sharp intervention 
that acts as a cure-all . Accordingly they should be assessed primarily on how well they 
maintain and motivate participants during the ‘on project’ period . The extent to which 
projects contribute to secondary desistance is a different, but related issue, as Hopkins 
and Wickson (2013) highlight, and projects also need to be judged on how they affect 
participants over time – which might involve several relapses and returns to the project . 
Lessons and issues
All evaluations of PPO projects identify lessons or issues which might be summarised 
(Worrall and Mawby 2004: 285-6) as:
•	 Embedding the project and establishing its credibility, securing long-
term funding;
•	 Having clear mechanisms for recruitment, selection and de-selection 
of participants;
•	 Demonstrating effective multi-agency practices, while recognising the distinctive 
contributions of each agency and resisting the blurring of agency boundaries;
•	 Planning for team development and for human resource contingencies, so 
that the levels of stress experienced by staff involved in such intensive work 
are minimised;
•	 Developing a challenging but supportive supervision regime with linked exit 
strategies, so that participants are not ‘set up to fail’ by the imposition of 
unrealistic multiple demands ;
•	 Identifying and addressing the communications needs specific to the project, 
so that the aims and objectives of the project are widely understood among 
partner agencies;
•	 Evidencing impact in the funding period .
We now highlight two issues that have implications beyond the projects themselves 
for brief further discussion – professional boundaries and intensive supervision for 
female offenders:
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Implications for professional boundaries
The key component of PPO projects is the closeness of the working relationship 
between the police and probation services . Historically mutually distrustful, the two 
services have undergone a cultural shift in their attitudes to working together, partly as 
a result of these projects (Mawby and Worrall 2013) . Physical co-location has produced 
much greater mutual understanding and there is now considerable evidence about the 
benefits of such co-operation . However, there have been concerns about the blurring 
of professional boundaries and the possible emergence of a ‘polibation’ officer (Nash 
1999) who embodies not necessarily the best aspects of the two cultures, but merely the 
least contentious (Mawby and Worrall 2004) . A further concern is that the partnership 
has become increasingly unequal with the stronger police service becoming increasingly 
dominant .  Having enthusiastically embraced the culture shift towards rehabilitation, 
those police officers involved in intensive supervision projects have now become key 
players in the government’s future plans . With the proposed fragmentation of probation 
service provision, the police are increasingly free to make partnerships with the private 
and voluntary sectors, risking the marginalisation of the probation service . 
Intensive supervision for female offenders
We have noted that the majority of offenders on PPO projects are male .  This is because 
most projects target prolific or persistent offenders and very few such offenders are 
women . Nevertheless, there is a long tradition in England and Wales of making separate, 
and often intensive, supervision arrangements for women (Worrall and Gelsthorpe 
2009; Gelsthorpe 2011; Hedderman 2011) . It has long been recognised (though not acted 
upon) that female offenders are subject to discrimination within the criminal justice 
system and that their small numbers (approximately 20% of all known offenders, 10% 
of all serious offenders and 5% of the prison population) limit the range of rehabilitative 
programmes available to them in practice . There are numerous academic, governmental 
and charitable reports on the differing needs of female offenders, both in prison and 
in the community, the most recent and arguably most influential being The Corston 
Report (2007) which argued strongly for improved alternatives to custody for the vast 
majority of women offenders .    Since the Corston Report, the government has been 
more willing to fund multi-agency initiatives, colloquially known as ‘one-stop shops’, 
which encourage a holistic approach to women offenders and enable them to access 
a full range of help under one roof .  Unfortunately, in the present economic climate, 
such funding is continually under threat, but local councils and voluntary organisations 
have often stepped in to enable the programmes to continue .  One of many examples 
is run in Stoke-on-Trent in the North Midlands of England, under the auspices of a large 
local voluntary organisation called ‘Brighter Futures’ .  The programme, called Chepstow 
House, was evaluated (Corcoran et al . 2011) and, as a consequence of a positive 
evaluation, the local council continued to fund the project when central government 
funding ceased after three years .  Although Chepstow House caters for a wide range of 
women in need, it makes special provision for women subject to probation supervision 
or recently released from prison .
The future of intensive supervision
The future of intensive supervision for adult offenders in England and Wales is 
inextricably bound up with the government’s plans for the future of the probation 
service .  The concept of probation has become increasingly unpopular with governments 
and the media and is associated with being ‘soft on crime’ (Mawby and Worrall 
2013) . For decades, successive governments have sought to ‘strengthen’ community 
supervision by incorporating more and more punitive elements in it and increasingly 
requiring the probation service to work collaboratively with the more punitive criminal 
justice agencies such as the police and prisons .  Although this has had some positive 
outcomes where high-risk serious offenders are concerned, it has resulted in the neglect 
of lower risk offenders and has also made the probation service (as the smallest partner 
in these collaborative arrangements) vulnerable to the vagaries of populist governments 
and the tabloid press .
At the start of 2013, the government published a consultation paper entitled 
‘Transforming Rehabilitation’ (Ministry of Justice 2013) in which it sets out its proposals 
for the future of the probation service and supervision of offenders in the community .  
It plans to allow the public sector service to retain its core tasks such as writing reports 
for courts, carrying out initial risk assessments and working collaboratively with other 
agencies in respect of serious offenders .  To this extent, it might be argued that intensive 
supervision will be protected .  However, supervision of the majority of medium- and low-
risk offenders will be commissioned competitively from a wide range of voluntary and 
private sector providers who will be paid according to the results they achieve (‘payment 
by results’) .  These proposals are controversial because they threaten the professional 
standing of probation officers and also assume that they are less able than the private 
and voluntary sectors to work creatively with offenders .  But above all, the proposals are 
aimed at reducing the costs of supervising offenders and this does not bode well for the 
kind of creative work that is central to intensive supervision . Government attention is 
turning from the complexities of intensive professional supervision to the less expensive 
use of volunteer mentors to provide support for lower risk offenders released from short 
prison sentences .  
Recent research into the occupational cultures of probation workers (Mawby and Worrall 
2013) suggests that they are a) enthusiastic to work creatively with offenders, b) very 
good at working collaboratively with other agencies, c) very conscious of their ‘public 
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protection’ role and very competent at holding the balance between this and their 
rehabilitative work but d) very concerned about the organisational and governmental 
constraints on their ability to work in the ways they want to . Intensive supervision is now 
very well embedded in the mainstream of probation work in England and Wales but its 
future is by no means certain, especially for those offenders defined as being of low or 
medium risk, who might be prevented from becoming prolific or persistent by being 
given greater professional attention .
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Appendix 3  
ECINS random sample (simplified) 
H=high; M=medium; L=low; P=prison; W=wanted; D = deselected
Sample number 10/2/14 13/3/14 11/4/14 04/7/14 18/8/14
1 32M 40H 32M 24M 18L
2 27M 40H 0L(P) 24M 36M
3 36M 48H 40H 33M 27M
4 44 H 36M 24M 24M 32M(D)
5 36M 36M 32M 24M 32M
6 44H 44H 40H 48H 0L(P)
7 36M 30M 27M 27M 18L
8 44H 48H 36M 48H 56H
9 40H 36M 30M 24M 24M(D)
10 48H 44H 44H 48H 36M
11 48H 48H 44H 48H 36M
12 44H 36M 27M 18L 30M
13 16L 16L 16L 24M 24M(D)
14 48H 40H 44H 30M 27M(D)
15 48H 0L(P) 40H 48H 36M
16 18L 18L 27M 27M 27M
17 20M 52H 30M 36M 36M
18 30M 33M 30M 32M 32M
19 24M 33M 36M 24M 24M(D)
20 44H 48H 44H 48H 48H
21 36M 36M 30M 33M 52H
22 44H 44H 52H 40H 40H(D)
23 4L 4L 4L 4L 4L(D)
24 48H 40H 48H 48H 0L(P)
25 44H 48H 40H 44H 0L(P)(D)
26 44H 24M 44H 0L(P) 0L(P)
27 18L 18L 33M 36M 36M
28 44H 0L(P) 0L(P) 32M 32M
29 18L 18L 18L 18L 18L(D)
30 48H 48H 0L(P) 48H 0L(P)
Appendix 4  
Selected PIR recommendations
3. Conduct  a  mapping  exercise  of  IOM to  better  understand  the  landscape  with  
an emphasis on defining roles and responsibilities .  
5. Multiagency  cross  partnership supervision  arrangements  need  clarity  
and revision given the geography of the hubs and the challenges faced by 
operational managers .
15. There needs to be clarity of roles and responsibilities across partnershipsthis is 
particularly evident in the police and there is a perceived blurred line between the 
role of field officers and IOM–based colleagues .
24. The academic partnerships that form part of IOM phase three should be supported . 
27. Greater use of structured case studies . 
28. Promote the use of offender debriefs . 
31. Continue to build on tactical links with prisons and a seamless IOM approach . 
35. Improved sequencing of pathways in particular prison to community . 
38. Improve information sharing awareness of operational staff .
45. Further steps should be taken to identify the needs of service users and 
pathway gaps . 
46. The IOM needs to better understand the ‘family circumstances’ of offenders and the 
wider needs of that family unit .
51. Improvements should  be made  in terms  of the  IOM relationship  with  Community 
Safety Partnerships .
52. IOM  courts should  be  considered  to  improve  the seamless  approach  to  
offender management . Court services need to be better linked to IOM governance .  
53. The strategic IOM group should continue to support third sector organisations and 
encourage them to work collectively and collaboratively in the provision of services . 
58. This approach should be fine–tuned and the process repeated using greater 
academic rigour and used as a tool to inform wider IOM development and the 
commissioning of services .
61. Commission multi agency workforce training and development programmes for IOM 
managers and frontline staff .
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